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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice  Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The basics of project evaluation  and lessons 
learned.
Willis H. Thomas.
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, c2012.
HD 69 P75 T477 2012
BIFF: quick responses to high conflict people: 
their personal attacks, hostile email  and social 
media meltdowns.
Bill Eddy.
Scottsdale, AZ: HCI Press, c2011.
BF 637 I48 E33 2011
Blended learning  in higher educat ion: 
framework, principles, and guidelines.
D. Randy Garrison, Norman D. Vaughan.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2008.
LB 2395.7 G365 2008
The charisma myth:  how anyone can master the 
art and science of personal magnetism.
Olivia Fox Cabane.
New York, NY: Portfolio/Penguin, 2012.
BF 698.35 C45 C33 2012
Communication counts [videorecording]: speaking 
and listening for results. 
CRM Learning; directed by Timothy Armstrong; 
written by Sara Judson Brown.
Carlsbad, CA: CRM Learning, c2012.
1 videodisc (19 min.): sd.,  col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD) + 1 CD-
ROM.
CD-ROM contains reproducible participant 
worksheets on PDFs.
Accompanying  leader's guide "provides suggestions 
for group training, including  one idea that allows 
your training  audience to interact with the video; as 
the video's characters complete the final quiz in 
their training  course, your trainees are able to 
answer the same questions (before  they  see how the 
video's characters respond). 
HF 5549.5 C6 C66 2012 D1586
Effective apology: mending  fences, building  bridges, 
and restoring trust.
John Kador.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2009.
BF 575 A75 K34 2009
Essentials of contemporary management.
Gareth R. Jones et al.
Whitby, ON: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, c2010.
HD 31 E79 2010
The geometry of fear:  an environmental 
perspective on fear and the perception of crime.
by Valerie Spicer.
Burnaby, BC: Simon Fraser University, 2012.
HV 6793 C2 S643 2012
The H factor of personality:  why some people are 
manipulative, self-entitled, materialistic, and 
exploitive - and why it matters for everyone.
Kibeom Lee and Michael C. Ashton.
Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 
c2012.
BF 698.3 L43 2012
Harder than I thought:  adventures of a twenty-
first century leader.
Robert D. Austin, Richard L. Nolan, Shannon 
O'Donnell.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, c2013.
HD 57.7 A849 2013
HR manager's guide to background checks and 
pre-employment testing.
Adrian Miedema, Christina Hall.
Toronto, ON: Carswell, 2012.
HF 5549.5 E429 M44 2012
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An introduction to systematic reviews.
edited by David Gough, Sandy Oliver, James 
Thomas.
London; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012.
H 62 I587 2012
A manual for writers of research papers, theses, 
and dissertations.
Chicago Style for students and researchers / Kate L. 
Turabian ; revised by Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. 
Colomb, Joseph M. Williams, and the University of 
Chicago Press editorial staff.
Chicago, IL; London: University  of Chicago Press, 
2013.
LB 2369 T87 2013
Mastering presentations: be the undisputed 
expert when you deliver presentations (even if 
you feel like you're going to throw up).
Doug Staneart.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, c2013.
HF 5718.22 S738 2013
Meeting  management challenges [videorecording]: 
part 1.
Mississauga, ON: RG Training Resources, 2012.
1 videodisc (11 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
Every workplace, no matter how successful, has to 
deal with difficult situations. But what are the most 
effective ways of responding  to employe issues? This 
presenter-led program guides audiences through a 
range of dramatic scenarios, which include personal 
interviews with key characters,who describe their 
thoughts and feelings as the story  unfolds. This is an 
ideal resource for any business or manager wanting 
greater insight into their employees and the various 
strategies for dealing with difficult situations.
HF 5549.5 C6 M448 2012 pt. 1 D1578
Meeting  management challenges [videorecording]: 
part 2.
Mississauga, ON: RG Training  Resources 
[distributor], 2012.
1 videodisc (11 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in. (DVD).
Workplaces are fast-paced, challenging  and diverse 
environments that can create conflict and 
misunderstanding. Successful resolution of problems
with colleagues is a vital aspect of good 
m a n a g e m e n t . Th i s f l y - o n - t h e - wa l l s t y l e 
dramatization takes viewers through ways to deal 
with the following: unreasonable demands; 
individuals who aren't team players; speaking 
without thinking; and dealing  with poor job 
performance.
HF 5549.5 C6 M448 2012 pt. 2 D1579
Pedagogy of the oppressed.
Paulo Freire; translated by Myra Bergman Ramos; 
with an introduction by Donald Macedo.
New York, NY: Continuum, c2000.
LB 880 F73 P4313 2000
The privacy advocates:  resisting  the spread of 
surveillance.
Colin J. Bennett.
Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 2010.
JC 596 B46 2010
The sketchnote handbook: the illustrated guide to 
visual note taking.
by Mike Rohde.
San Francisco, CA: Peachpit Press, c2013.
LB 2395.25 R64 2013
Supporting  students for success in  online and 
distance education.
Ormond Simpson.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2012.
LC 5800 S55 2012
Threat detector [videorecording]:  your role in 
preventing workplace violence.
StoneArch Creative.
Irvine, CA: Learning Communications, c2010.
1 videodisc (17 min.): sd., col. with b&w sequences; 4 3/4 in. 
(DVD) + 1 CD-ROM.
This program defines threatening  behavior and takes 
a look at red flag  behaviors in the workplace. 
Viewers will be given a chance to test their own 
"threat detector" capabilities. The accompanying  CD-
ROM contains a facilitator guide.
HF 5549.5 E43 T47 2010 D1580
www.10-8.ca
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‘SMART’PHONE	 DATA	 DUMP	 
ONE	 MONTH	 AFTER	 ARREST	 
UNREASONABLE
R. v. Hiscoe, 2013 NSCA 48
 
The accused was arrested for 
possessing  a  controlled substance for 
the purpose of trafficking. While 
under surveillance, police saw an 
exchange between him and the 
driver of another vehicle. They found cash in the 
other driver’s vehicle and a bag  of cocaine on the 
ground between the two vehicles. During  the arrest 
procedure a  police officer seized the  accused's 
“smart” cell phone which was on the driver’s seat of 
his car. It was not password protected. The officer 
opened the cell phone and conducted a cursory 
review of recent text messages. Later that evening, 
the officer again looked at the  texts and transcribed 
them. Then, about a month later, the officer took the 
cell phone to the Technological Crime Unit and the 
entire contents of the  cell phone were downloaded 
and placed on a DVD. This information included a 
contact list, phone logs, a record of calls to and from 
the cell phone, the content of incoming  and 
outgoing  text messages, and half a dozen 
photographs. The accused was charged with 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
 
Nova Scotia Provincial Court
 
The police  officer testified that he seizes 
cell phones of people  arrested for drug 
trafficking  because the phones will often 
contain score sheets, records of drug 
debts, contacts of other persons, text messages and 
phone calls in the time leading  up  to the offence. 
This information can indicate the negotiation of drug 
prices and amounts, meeting  places and other 
details, which can be time sensitive as they may 
disclose possible stash or weapon locations. The 
officer also explained that information on cell 
phones can be deleted remotely. But he agreed there 
were no exigent circumstances preventing  him from 
getting  a  search warrant before he transcribed the 
messages. Rather, he felt he did not need to get a 
warrant. The accused argued that the  searches of his 
cell phone were unreasonable, exceeded the scope 
of the  power to search incident to arrest and that any 
evidence of the cell phone contents ought to be 
excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
The judge found the examination of the cell phone 
on arrest to view the recent text messages and the 
later transcribing  of those messages that same day 
were within the lawful scope of the police authority 
to search incident to the accused’s arrest for 
possession of a  controlled substance for the purpose 
of trafficking. Those searches did not violate  s. 8 of 
the Charter and the evidence retrieved at those times 
was admissible. The complete content download or 
“data dump,” however, did go beyond the scope of a 
search incident to arrest, breached s. 8  and was 
excluded. In the judge’s opinion, the one month 
delay in searching  the cell phone significantly 
reduced any connection with the arrest. Further, he 
found the police made no effort to limit or focus 
their search in the separate locations within the cell 
phone. Instead, a  full “data dump” was done for the 
purpose of furthering  their investigation, not as a 
search incident to arrest. After limiting  himself to the 
evidence of the admissible text messages, the judge 
acquitted the accused of the trafficking  related 
charge, but entered a conviction on the  lesser and 
included offence of simple possession.
 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
 
The Crown appealed the trial 
judge’s s. 8 ruling  on the data 
dump because, in its view, had the 
excluded evidence been admitted 
the accused may not necessarily have been 
acquitted of the trafficking  charge. The Crown 
asserted that once the police lawfully seized the cell 
phone incident to arrest, they lawfully possessed all 
the information contained in it and could search it 
without a warrant and without restriction. The 
Crown suggested in its factum:
Where the police lawfully arrest a person for an 
offence, and seize the arrestee’s smartphone or 
other device in the reasonable expectation of 
finding  evidence of the offence, the power to 
search incident to arrest includes the ability not 
only to seize and conduct a cursory examination of 
the smartphone but also the ability to later perform 
a more detailed retrieval of its contents.  A further 
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search warrant is not required. The important 
limiting factor is that any examination  of data - 
cursory or otherwise - must truly be authorized by 
the original power of search incident to  arrest:  
namely, in pursuit of a reasonable basis to believe 
that the examination will afford evidence of the 
original offence.
 
Justice Oland, authoring  the Nova Scotia  Court of 
Appeal’s decision, concluded that the warrantless 
and complete content download or “data dump” of 
the cell phone did infringe the accused’s s. 8  rights 
because  it went beyond the scope of a search 
incident to arrest. In doing  so, Justice Oland first 
examined search incident to arrest and identified the 
following points:
 
• s. 8  of the Charter protects individuals from 
unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy.
 
• Warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable.
• The Crown has the burden of showing  that, on 
a balance of probabilities, a warrantless search 
was reasonable = authorized by law + the law 
itself is reasonable + the manner in which the 
search was carried out is reasonable.
• The common law power of search incident to 
arrest is a well-recognized exception to the 
warrantless search presumption. Such searches 
do not require prior judicial authorization.
 
• Searches incident to arrest are subject to 
limitations. The search must have a  valid 
objective (ensuring  the safety of the police and 
public, preserving  evidence or discovering 
evidence)  and be truly incidental to the  arrest.  
Although police do not need reasonable and 
probable grounds to search, they must have 
some reason related to the arrest for conducting 
a search.
• Delay and distance between the arrest and 
search do not automatically preclude a search 
from being  incidental to arrest provided the 
police offer a proper explanation for the delay 
or distance.
 
He then noted there  were three different views on 
searches of cell phones following arrest:
1. the police cannot make even a cursory 
inspection of the cell phone without a warrant;
2. the police can examine the  entire contents of 
the cell phone so long  as they are genuinely 
looking  for evidence of the offence and have a 
reasonable basis to believe they will find it; or
3. the police can only  make a cursory warrantless 
inspection of the cell phone. Any examination 
beyond a cursory examination exceeds the 
power of search incident to arrest and a  search 
warrant should be obtained.
 
In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial 
judge did not err. He legitimately considered the 
substantial delay between arrest and search (a 
month) as a factor in deciding  whether the search 
was incident to arrest is lawful.  “Although the 
temporal separation is a rebuttable presumption, at 
trial the Crown presented no evidence whatsoever 
explaining  the  delay in examining  the cell phone 
further,” said Justice  Oland. As well, the trial judge 
properly  inferred that there was a heightened 
expectation of privacy in the smartphone, given the 
variety and breadth of information that can be stored 
in it. Here, the police made no effort to limit the 
scope of their search of the cell phone, instead doing 
a full content download which even captured over a 
dozen messages that came to the phone after it was 
Side Bar:                               
Passwords and Protection Features
Justice Oland noted that password protection, if 
engaged, would not be a significant factor nor 
conclusive in determining whether a search warrant 
would be required to search a cell phone.   “While 
the presence or absence of a password or lock may 
be another relevant factor in determining whether a 
search incident to arrest is lawful or within its 
proper parameters, in my view it should not be 
determinative,” he said. “Whether such a security 
feature exists or is turned on is not substantively 
helpful in determining the privacy interests of the 
accused in the contents of his cell phone, nor the 
propriety of a police search. Just because a password 
is not on at the very moment the police seize a cell 
phone cannot mean that the state is welcome and 
free to roam through its contents.”
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seized. The trial judge was aware of the 
compartmentalization of information on a cell 
phone and the problems of over seizure. He 
emphasized that police  did not try to minimize or 
focus the search. Rather, they simply retrieved the 
full contents of the smartphone. This was all done 
even though the police said that there were  no 
exigent circumstances. The warrantless full content 
download of the accused’s cell phone breached s. 8 
of the Charter and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
  
CONTINUITY	 CRITICAL:	 
POSSESSION	 CHARGE	 NOT	 
PROVEN
R. v. Panrucker, 2013 BCCA 137
 
The accused was booked into police 
cells on December 22, occupying 
cell 5. On December 29 he left the 
cell to take a shower. A prison guard 
searched the cell and discovered a 
plastic  bag  containing  cocaine underneath the 
mattress. He was charged with possession under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
 
British Columbia Provincial Court
 
Since the drugs were  not found in the 
accused’s actual possession the  Crown 
relied on circumstantially proving 
constructive possession – s. 4(3)(a)(ii)  of 
the Criminal Code. The judge found the guard to be 
“very  careful and conscientious,” “meticulous in 
doing  his job,” and “scrupulous in searching  a cell 
once the occupant has left even temporarily.” The 
judge was satisfied that the accused was the sole 
occupant of cell 5 and the only reasonable inference 
from the evidence was that the cocaine found was in 
his control and knowledge. He was convicted of 
possessing the cocaine.
 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
 
The accused’s conviction was set 
aside and an acquittal was 
entered. The Crown conceded on 
appeal that the trial verdict was unreasonable. Here, 
knowledge and control of the drugs was not the only 
rational inference that could be drawn from the 
admissible evidence. 
The guard testified that the accused was the  only 
inmate resident in cell 5 for the week, but he only 
worked at the jail for 2 ½ days. He also said he 
cleaned and searched the  cell the day before the 
accused’s arrival, however he was not on duty when 
the accused was booked into cells. Nor did he have 
any personal information about what may have 
happened in the cell between the time he cleaned it 
and the accused’s arrival. The guard could also not 
say whether the accused spent his entire time in cell 
5 or whether anyone else was in it when he was not 
on duty.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
REASONABLE	 INFERENCE	 MAY	 
BE	 TAKEN	 FROM	 INFORMATION
R. v. Murray, 2013 ONCA 173
 
Police received a 911 call about a 
single vehicle accident in the early 
morning  hours.  They found an 
overturned vehicle on its roof, badly 
damaged and in a ditch. Two 
occupants were trapped in it. The accused was 
hanging  from his seatbelt in the driver’s seat and his 
injured 90-year-old mother was hanging  upside 
down from her seatbelt in the front passenger seat. 
The accused was extricated from the vehicle and 
transported to the hospital along  with his mother. A 
police officer also attended the hospital to continue 
the investigation. Samples of the accused’s blood 
were taken for medical purposes at the hospital. The 
police subsequently obtained a  search warrant for 
the production of the hospital’s medical records that 
revealed the analysis of the accused’s blood alcohol 
concentration (BAC). Test results revealed his BAC at 
the time of the accident was somewhere within the 
range of 240mg% and 395mg%. He was charged 
with impaired driving  causing  bodily harm, driving 
over 80mg% causing  bodily  harm and dangerous 
driving.
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Ontario Superior Court of Justice
 
The accused argued, among  other 
grounds, that the search warrant obtained 
for the production of medical records 
should be quashed. In part, he suggested 
the officer failed to set out reasonable  grounds in the 
Information to Obtain (ITO). Furthermore, he 
asserted that his BAC could not be used to prove the 
charges because the capability, accuracy and 
reliability of the hospital testing  equipment had not 
been established. The hospital lab  technician only 
testified that her job  was to analyze the specimens, 
run the machines and report to the doctor. She did 
not provide evidence about the type  of instrument 
used to analyze the samples nor any details about its 
maintenance or the safeguards in place. 
The judge  dismissed both of these submissions. First, 
he found the warrant was properly issued. Second, 
he found the test results were accurate and reliable 
on the criminal standard of proof (beyond a 
reasonable doubt):
 
In assessing  how much weight I am to place on 
the test results, I am compelled to consider not 
only the fact that the testing  was conducted by a 
qualified technologist, but also the fact the 
laboratory in which the testing  equipment was 
located and in which the testing and analysis 
was performed was in a large urban hospital. 
This laboratory was designed to service doctors 
and other trained medical professionals. It is 
implicit that these medical professionals were 
prepared to rely on the laboratory results to 
make their decisions, decisions which impact 
the health, and sometimes the life of hospital 
patients.  It is also implicit that a laboratory 
which is designed and operated for these 
purposes will use reliable and well maintained 
and calibrated equipment.
 
The accused was convicted of all three charges.
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
 
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions contending  the search 
warrant was invalid since there  was 
nothing  in the ITO to indicate that 
the hospital would test or had tested his blood’s 
BAC. The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. It 
found such facts could be inferred from the 
evidence:
 
In our view, the details of the incident recited in 
the information to obtain, including evidence 
that alcohol was present in the vehicle, the 
behaviour of the [accused] and the fact that the 
[accused’s] breath smelled of alcohol, when 
combined with his presence at the emergency 
department for treatment, were sufficient to 
provide a basis for a reasonable inference that 
the hospital would test the [accused’s] blood for 
alcohol as a matter of course in determining 
how best to treat him medically. [para. 4]
 
The accused again suggested that the evidence of 
the lab’s BAC tests results should not have been 
admitted nor given any weight because the hospital 
lab  technician provided no details about the 
equipment used or its reliability. The Court of Appeal 
found the trial judge did not err in deciding  this 
issue, citing  Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 2 
(Chadbourn Rev., 1979), s. 665(a), at pp. 917-19:
 
The use of scientific instruments, apparatus, 
formulas, and calculating  tables, involves to 
some extent a dependence on the statements of 
other persons, even of anonymous observers. Yet 
it is not feasible for the professional man to test 
every instrument himself; furthermore he finds 
that practically the standard methods are 
sufficiently to be trusted. Thus, the use of an X-
ray machine may give correct knowledge, 
though the user may neither have seen the 
object with his own eyes nor have made the 
calculations and adjustments on which the 
machine’s trustworthiness depends. The 
adequacy of knowledge thus gained is 
recognized for a variety of standard instruments. 
In some instances the calculating  tables or 
statistical results are admitted directly, under an 
exception to the hearsay rule. [Citations 
omitted.]
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
 
Editor’s Note:  Additional case facts taken from R. v. 
Murray, 2011 ONSC 3735, 2011 ONSC 2537.
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SHARING	 CRA	 DOCUMENTS	 OK
Brown v. Canada, 2013 FCA 111
 
Police officers executed a Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) 
search warrant at the accused’s 
residence. The warrant was based on 
allegations that the accused was 
engaged in cocaine trafficking. The warrant 
authorized the seizure  of, among  other things, 
proceeds of crime, illegal drugs, financial 
documents and other relevant information. No one 
was home at the time the warrant was served. Police 
seized 13.6  grams of crack  cocaine, a cellular 
phone, tax records and other documents belonging 
to the accused. He was charged with trafficking  but 
the case did not proceed to trial. The charge was 
dropped for lack of evidence. In the meantime, 
police had shared the documents seized with 
officials of the  Canada Revenue Agency (CRA)  and 
reassessments were made under the Income Tax Act 
(ITA)  for several taxation years. Undeclared income 
was added to each taxation year and gross 
negligence penalties imposed.
 
Tax Court of Canada
 
Brown appealed the reassessments 
arguing  that his s. 8  Charter rights were 
violated when the police forwarded 
copies of the documents seized under the 
CDSA warrant to the CRA. An investigating  officer 
explained that it was common practice for police to 
give the CRA information obtained on persons 
charged with trafficking  or other illegal business 
activities because these individuals often do not 
report such income for fear of prosecution for their 
crimes. 
The judge ruled that since it was permissible under 
the Charter for a  CRA officer to pass on documents 
properly obtained in the course of an audit to 
officials later carrying  on a criminal investigation (R. 
v. Jarvis, 2002 SCC 73), it was equally permissible 
for police to share information with CRA auditors. 
The documents passed from the police to the CRA 
were therefore admissible for audit purposes. 
Brown’s appeal from reassessment was dismissed.
 
Federal Court of Canada
 
Brown appealed the Tax Court of 
Canada’s decision, asserting  once 
again that the documents should 
not have been accepted into 
evidence. Justice Dawson, delivering  the judgment 
for the Federal Court of Appeal, disagreed albeit for 
different reasons. In this case, the search and seizure 
was lawful. The police were authorized by a valid 
warrant, which had not been challenged. Brown did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
(subjectively or objectively)  over the seized 
documents such that the police were required to 
maintain their confidentiality. Subjectively, Brown 
said the seized documents should have been 
returned to him so the CRA could ask him to turn 
them over. This evidence was inconsistent with any 
subjective expectation of privacy. Objectively, 
taxpayers are obliged to keep  records and to 
produce them during  an audit. Since Brown failed to 
demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy  in 
the seized documents, his s. 8  rights were not 
breached and the documents were correctly 
received into evidence.  
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
CRA Reassessments & Penalties
How much undeclared income was added 
to Brown’s taxation years?
2004 = $20,715
2005 = $116,992
2006 = $26,405
2007 = $31,296
What were the gross negligence penalties 
that were imposed?
2004 = $1,620
2005 = $15,544
2006 = $4,036
2007 = $2,959
R. v. Brown, 2012 TCC 251
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Supreme Court of Canada
UTTERING	 THREATS:	 RECIPIENT	 NEED	 NOT	 
TAKE	 IT	 SERIOUSLY
The accused was charged with 
uttering  threats to cause bodily 
harm after he spoke to his ex-
girlfriend on the phone. He 
repeatedly told her he would kill her if she went 
forward with the planned abortion of their child. He 
was incarcerated at the time and the ex-girlfriend 
testified she was not intimidated nor fearful as he had 
frequently talked this way. The accused was acquitted 
after a Manitoba Provincial Court trial judge was not 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt the accused 
intended that his words would intimidate or be taken 
seriously. The Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed a 
Crown appeal. 
On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
acquittal was upheld by a 4:3 margin. The Court noted 
the essential elements of uttering  threats under s. 264.1
(1)(a) of the Criminal Code:
1. ACTUS REUS - the uttering of threats of death or 
serious bodily harm; and
2. MENS REA - the words spoken or written as a 
threat to cause death or serious bodily harm 
were meant to intimidate or be taken seriously.
The majority agreed that the Crown did not need to 
prove that the recipient of the threat felt intimidated or 
took it seriously. Instead, all that needed to be proven 
was that the accused intended them to have that effect. 
However, the trial judge still needed to be satisfied the 
necessary mens rea was present. The judge never said 
she was acquitting the accused solely because the 
recipient of the threats did not take them seriously. 
Instead, she was left with a reasonable doubt on the 
accused’s mens rea. There was no error in entering  an 
acquittal.
The minority would have allowed the appeal, entered a 
conviction and remitted the matter back to Provincial 
Court for sentencing. In its view, the trial judge erred in 
making  the threat recipient’s perception the 
determinative factor. Rather than asking  what a 
reasonable person would objectively perceive, the 
judge asked what the recipient herself perceived. - R. 
v. Obrien, 2013 SCC 2.
Supreme Court of Canada
VEHICLE	 FORFEITURE	 ORDERED	 FOR	 IMPAIRED	 
DRIVING	 OFFENCE
The accused pled guilty to 
impaired driving in the Court of 
Quebec. He was sentenced to 12 
months imprisonment and was 
prohibited from driving for five years. The Crown also 
sought forfeiture of the truck he was driving at the time 
of his arrest because it was offence-related property 
under the Criminal Code. But the trial judge refused to 
order forfeiture. In his view, after considering  the 
objectives and principles of sentencing, the accused 
had demonstrated that the impact of the forfeiture 
would be disproportionate under s. 490.41(3) of the 
Criminal Code. The Quebec Court of Appeal found the 
trial judge erred in considering the accused’s sentence 
when deciding whether the vehicle would be forfeited, 
but nonetheless dismissed a Crown appeal. It found the 
trial judge properly considered the accused’s personal 
circumstances in weighing the impact of the forfeiture 
order.
The Supreme Court of Canada, however, allowed a 
further Crown appeal and ordered the vehicle forfeited. 
Under s. 490.41(3) a court may decide not to order 
forfeiture if the impact of the order would be 
disproportionate to (1) the nature and gravity of the 
offence, (2) the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the offence and (3) the criminal record, 
if any, of the offender. The unanimous Supreme Court 
concluded that the impact of forfeiture was not 
disproportionate. The trial judge erroneously 
emphasized the accused’s personal circumstances and 
failed to give appropriate weight to his criminal record, 
which included five convictions for alcohol related 
driving  offences and three breaches of probation or 
undertaking. - R. v. Manning, 2013 SCC 1
Jurisprudence Jolt
IN BRIEF: This section provides a peek of what’s happening in appeal courts across the country.
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
REASONABLE	 GROUNDS	 TO	 BE	 VIEWED	 IN	 
TOTALITY,	 NOT	 PIECEMEAL
Police obtained two wiretap 
authorizations to intercept private 
communications. The judge granted 
the authorizations on the basis of a 
chronologically organized 167 page affidavit, which 
included references to undercover drug  transactions, 
source information and surveillance evidence. The trial 
judge refused an application by the defence to cross-
examine the affiant and the accused’s arguments on the 
facial invalidity of the warrant were rejected. 
Convictions for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and 
methamphetamine, trafficking and possession of a 
restricted weapon followed.
The accused appealed his convictions arguing, among 
other grounds, that the affidavit failed to provide 
reasonable grounds for the issuance of the wiretap 
authorizations. The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that, as part of the key requirements for 
a wiretap authorization, the affidavit must establish that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence 
has been committed or is being  committed and that the 
authorization sought will afford evidence of that crime. 
As for reasonable grounds, the question for a reviewing 
judge is not whether they would have granted the 
order, but whether there was any basis on which the 
issuing justice could have done so. In other words, the 
reviewing judge does not stand in the place of the 
judge signing  the authorization, but should only set the 
authorization aside if there is no basis on which it 
could be sustained. In reviewing the affidavit, the judge 
is to examine the “totality of the circumstances,” not 
assess the evidence in a piecemeal fashion. In this 
case, Justice Ryan found the affidavit contained 
sufficient facts capable of supporting  a reasonable 
belief. The trial judge properly held that the informant 
information in the affidavit contained sufficient indicia 
of reliability to have formed part of the grounds relied 
upon in support of the authorization. “Viewed in 
totality, the informant information was sufficiently 
detailed, reliable, and corroborated to have been 
considered by the authorizing  judge,” she said. - R. v. 
MacNeil, 2013 BCCA 16.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
CIRCUMSTANTIAL	 EVIDENCE	 ANALYZED	 AS	 A	 
WHOLE,	 NOT	 AS	 INDIVIDUAL	 PIECES
The accused was a passenger in a 
vehicle stopped by police during  a 
roadblock. While obtaining  the 
driver’s l icense and vehicle 
registration, police smelled marihuana coming from the 
vehicle and arrested the occupants. The accused was 
carrying  a brown paper bag  containing $7,780 
underneath his sweater and $717 was found in his 
wallet. Another $5,000 was found in a backpack 
behind the front passenger seat. Silver vacuum sealable 
bags, often used for packaging  marihuana, were also 
found in the vehicle. A drug detention dog 
subsequently alerted on the money. At trial a police 
Personal Circumstances?
Just what were Manning’s personal circumstances 
that the trial judge erroneously overemphasized in 
finding the vehicle forfeiture disproportionate? 
• he lived on social assistance
• he was unemployed
• the vehicle (valued at $1,00) was his sole asset
• he had no income to procure a new vehicle
• he needed a vehicle to obtain food and 
clothing or to get to the hospital (he and his 
spouse had health problems)
• he lived with his spouse in a motel room
• he had no financial resources to take a taxi
• the only means of transport was to ask a 
friend to drive his truck
See R. v. Manning, 2011 QCCA 900
CASE QUOTE
“Where the grounds are based in whole or in part on 
information from an informant, the Court must consider 
the ‘totality of the circumstances’ to determine whether 
the informant information was sufficiently reliable to 
have formed part of the grounds to support the 
authorization or warrant.   Under this approach the 
Court must consider: (i)   the extent to which the 
information predicting the criminal offence is 
compelling, i.e., the extent of detail provided; (ii)   the 
credibility or reliability of the source; and (iii) the extent 
of corroboration. These are not separate tests but rather 
factors to be evaluated as part of the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’.   Weaknesses in one area may be 
overcome by strengths in the others.” - R. v. MacNeil at 
para. 52. 
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officer provided an expert opinion that the manner in 
which the money was bound was consistent with how 
drug traffickers handle it. The accused contended that 
his possession of the $7,780 was capable of an 
innocent explanation, such as when he told officers he 
had the cash to buy a car. But he was convicted of 
possessing proceeds of crime anyway.
The accused challenged his conviction to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, suggesting  the verdict was 
unreasonable and not supported by the evidence. But 
the Appeal Court disagreed. Although the Crown must 
prove that the property seized was proceeds of crime 
and that the accused had knowledge of its character, it 
need not prove it by direct evidence, but may do so 
through circumstantially. The test for circumstantial 
evidence is that the trial judge must be satisfied beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the accused’s guilt is the only 
reasonable inference to be drawn from the proven 
facts. Each piece of evidence is not to be analyzed 
separately and out of context. Instead, the correct 
approach is to consider the whole of the entire body of 
admissible evidence rather than identifying each piece 
of evidence and offering some other explanation for it. 
Here, the trial judge applied the correct legal test, 
explained the evidence she accepted and relied upon, 
did not speculate on possible explanations and 
concluded that the evidence supported a finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed. - R. v. Carpio, 2012 BCCA 484.
Ontario Court of Appeal
IN-DOCK	 IDENTIFICATION	 TO	 BE	 GIVEN	 LITTLE,	 
IF	 ANY,	 WEIGHT
The accused was convicted by a 
jury in the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice on two counts of robbery 
after an assailant, armed with a 
gun, entered a car rental establishment and stole 
$2,500 from the owner and $50 from a customer. The 
assailant had kicked in the door, pointed a gun at each 
of the victims, took their money and left. The entire 
event took about two minutes. At trial, both victims 
testified they had briefly seen the assailant on a 
previous occasion about two months before the 
robbery when he came in to rent a car. At that time 
neither victim assisted the man with a real transaction 
and the owner had no memory of observing anything 
unusual about the man’s appearance, such as the 
condition of his teeth, visible scars or tattoos. He 
merely described him as a 5’8”, “black guy.” The owner 
pulled the man’s rental file, viewed a copy of the 
accused’s health card and identified his picture as 
being the assailant. Both victim’s also provided in-dock 
identification. The accused was sentenced to 10 years 
in prison
The accused appealed his conviction suggesting the 
trial judge did not adequately charge the jury with 
respect to eyewitness identification. Justice Epstein, 
delivering the Ontario Court of Appeal judgment, 
agreed. There are dangers inherent in eyewitness 
identification evidence. “It is essential to recognize that 
it is generally the reliability, not the credibility, of the 
eyewitness' identification that must be established,” 
said Justice Epstein. “The danger is an honest but 
inaccurate identification.” A judge must instruct a jury 
to consider the frailties of eyewitness identification and 
consider such things as:
1. Was the suspect known to the witness?  
2. What were the circumstances of the contact 
during  the commission of the crime including 
whether the opportunity to see the suspect was 
lengthy or fleeting? 
3. Was the sighting by the witness in circumstances 
of stress? 
4. Was the witnesses’ description of the assailant 
generic or vague, or was it a detailed description 
that included references to distinctive features?
The charge to a jury must include a caution that in-
dock or in-court identification is to be given negligible, 
if any, weight. 
In this case, the witnesses only had a few minutes to 
observe their assailant under highly stressful 
circumstances - facing a man at close range pointing  a 
gun at them. Their descriptions were generic and 
neither witness noticed any distinctive features - the 
accused had two permanent gold front teeth, a 7” scar 
on his jaw and a 3.5 cm tattoo on his left hand. There 
was also no physical evidence - no surveillance 
OLD SCHOOL: CASE QUOTE
“It is true that a man is not called upon to explain 
suspicious things, but there comes a time when, 
circumstantial evidence having enveloped a man in a 
strong and cogent network of inculpatory facts, that 
man is bound to make some explanation or stand 
condemned.” - R. v. Jenkins (1908),  14 C.C.C. 221 
(B.C.C.A.) at p. 230. 
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footage, no DNA, no fingerprints. The trial judge did 
not adequately instruct the jury on eyewitness evidence 
and their duty to scrutinize it with considerable care. 
The convictions were quashed and acquittals entered. 
- R. v. Jack, 2013 ONCA 80
Alberta Court of Appeal
FINDING	 OF	 UNCONSTITUTIONALITY	 DID	 NOT	 
REPEAL	 CDSA	 PROVISIONS
The accuseds were convicted in 
the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
B e n c h o f p o s s e s s i n g  a n d 
producing marihuana. But they 
challenged their findings of guilt to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal by suggesting that the provisions under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) for which 
they were charged were not in force because of 
inadequacies in the Regulations.
First, they argued that since some courts had found 
constitutional flaws in the medical marihuana 
provisions in the past, Parliament was required to re-
enact the CDSA provisions. In their opinion, court 
decisions that previously declared the medical 
exemptions for marihuana possession unconstitutional 
effectively repealed the CDSA sections that created the 
offence of marihuana possession and the passage of the 
new Regulations did not revive them. Because 
Parliament had never re-enacted the CDSA, they 
suggested there was no existing offence for which they 
could be charged. The Court of Appeal disagreed. “The 
finding of constitutional invalidity because of the 
inadequacies in the Regulations did not result in any 
repeal of the CDSA,” it said. “That statute may have 
been unenforceable in some provinces for a short 
period of time with respect to those with relevant 
medical problems, but when the identi f ied 
inadequacies were remedied by the new Regulations, 
any constitutional problem disappeared. It was not 
necessary for Parliament to re-enact the CDSA.” 
Second, their suggestion that their constitutional rights 
were impaired because the medical exemption 
application process is bureaucratic, frustrating, 
complex, plagued by delay and inconvenient was also 
without merit. “The Charter is there to protect the 
fundamental rights of Canadians,” said the Court. 
“Mere administrative inconvenience, or the wish to be 
free from government regulation, does not entitle the 
[accuseds] to pick and choose which statutes will be 
binding  on them.” It was also noted that one of the 
accuseds subsequently obtained a licence which 
showed that the bureaucratic obstacles were not 
insurmountable. Finally, the assertion that it is 
burdensome to obtain a medical exemption and 
difficult to find a physician to support a need for 
medical marihuana was also rejected. “There is no free 
standing Charter right to a lifestyle involving the 
recreational consumption of marihuana, nor is there 
any right to self-medicate.” The onus was on the 
accuseds to prove that they were entitled to an 
exemption by successfully applying for a permit under 
the Regulations or providing a court with sufficient 
facts and valid legal arguments to show that they were 
otherwise entitled to an exemption. It was not sufficient 
that they only assert a medical need to obtain a 
constitutional exemption. They failed to meet their 
onus and their appeals from conviction were 
dismissed. - R. v. Voss, 2013 ABCA 38
Alberta Court of Appeal
OFFICERS’TESTIMONY	 ABOUT	 VIDEO	 
OBSERVATIONS	 ADMISSIBLE
Where an original video recording 
or a copy was unavailable at trial, 
photographs made from the video 
and the police evidence of what 
was seen on it were admissible at the accused’s 
robbery trial. Security cameras had captured three 
suspects on video and photographs were made from it. 
At the accused’s Alberta Provincial Court trial the judge 
admitted the photos and allowed the officers to testify 
as to what they observed in the video. The accused was 
convicted but appealed, arguing the trial judge 
erroneously admitted the photos and police evidence.  
CASE QUOTE
“‘[E]yewitness identification evidence has taught us to 
use discriminating scrutiny for badges of unreliability.’ 
One such ‘badge’ is whether a witness’ description of the 
suspect fails to include mention of ‘a distinctive feature 
of the accused’.” - R. v.  Jack at para.  29 citing R. v. 
Gonsalves (2008), 56 C.R. (6th) 379 (Ont. S.C.J.)
CASE QUOTE
“[T]here is no free standing Charter right to a lifestyle 
involving the recreational consumption of marihuana, 
nor is there any right to self-medicate.”” - R. v. Voss at 
para. 8 citing R. v. Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74.
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The Alberta Court of Appeal found “the best evidence 
rule does not preclude the admission of viva voce 
evidence of persons who observed the video.” The best 
evidence rule recognizes that real evidence is usually 
more reliable than human evidence. However, how 
much weight the judge gives to the evidence and its 
reliability will vary. So in this case, the judge was 
entitled to admit the testimonial evidence of what the 
police officers observed in the video and give it the 
appropriate weight. As for a photograph, it “is 
admissible in evidence if it accurately represents the 
facts, is not tendered with the intention to deceive and 
is verified on oath by a person capable to do so.” Here, 
the trial judge properly found the officer’s testimony 
satisfactorily proved the accuracy and fairness of the 
photographs. - R. v. J.S.C., 2013 ABCA 157 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
CELL	 PHONE	 CALL	 ADMISSIBLE	 AS	 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL	 EVIDENCE	 OF	 DRUG	 
POSSESSION
After the accused was arrested for 
possessing cocaine for the purpose 
of trafficking, police searched the 
van he was driving  and found 
cocaine, a digital scale, paper flaps and a cell phone. 
Shortly thereafter, the phone rang and an officer 
answered it. A female asked for “Rick” and said she 
wanted to “trade a recently stolen bicycle for 1 gram of 
soft.” At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
judge found the telephone conversation was 
inadmissible as circumstantial evidence to establish 
that the accused possessed the cocaine since no voir 
dire had been held. The accused was nevertheless 
convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking on the basis of the remaining evidence. 
While the accused appealed his conviction, the Crown 
argued that the trial judge erred in ruling  the cellphone 
conversation inadmissible. Justice Neilson, writing  the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision, found the 
judge did err in excluding  the conversation. Drug 
purchase calls are admissible as circumstantial 
evidence of drug possession, such as knowledge of the 
presence or purpose of the drugs. In the Court of 
Appeal’s view, the cell phone conversation was 
“properly admissible as circumstantial evidence 
without the necessity of a voir dire, and she should 
have considered it in determining  whether the Crown 
had established [the accused] knew the cocaine was in 
the van.” - R. v. Graham, 2013 BCCA 75.
Ontario Court of Appeal
CROWN	 MUST	 PROVE	 STATEMENT	 GIVEN	 TO	 
POLICE	 WAS	 VOLUNTARY
The Crown bears the burden of 
proving  that a statement to police 
is voluntary beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Although this does not 
require a verbatim record of the interaction between an 
accused and the police on the voir dire, an incomplete 
or inaccurate record or notable inconsistencies in the 
officers’ testimony may raise a reasonable doubt about 
the voluntariness of a statement. On charges of 
accessing and possessing child pornography, the 
Ontario Court of Justice was not satisfied that the 
evidence of the police officers accurately or completely 
set forth the sequence of events or the details of the 
encounter.  Furthermore, the judge explained that the 
police “had complete control over the pace of the 
investigation, where and when it would proceed, who 
would be involved and what equipment or aids would 
be utilized.” The accused’s statements made before and 
after his arrest were excluded and he was acquitted. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s 
findings. “The quality of the record was something 
entirely within the power of the authorities to 
determine, in circumstances fully orchestrated by the 
police,” said the Appeal Court. “Given that the officers 
were operating in a relatively controlled environment 
where they knew in advance that an important 
conversation with a suspect was about to occur, the 
trial judge concluded that it was reasonable to expect 
that they would take reasonable steps to protect the 
integrity of the record. He found that was not done.” 
Since the trial judge could not be satisfied that the 
statements were voluntary – made without threats, 
promises or inducement – there was no basis to 
interfere with his decision. The Crown’s appeal was 
dismissed. - R. v. Blain, 2013 ONCA 224
CASE QUOTE
“The best evidence rule provides an admonition that real 
evidence is usually more reliable than human 
evidence. ... In our view the best evidence rule does not 
preclude the admission of viva voce evidence of persons 
who observed the video” - R. v. J.S.C. at paras. 14-16.
www.10-8.ca
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Ontario Court of Appeal
POSSESSION	 CONVICTIONS	 SUPPORTED	 BY	 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL	 EVIDENCE
The accused was convicted in the 
Ontario Court of Justice of 
possessing cocaine for the purpose 
o f t r a f f i c k i n g , m a r i h u a n a 
possession and possessing  proceeds of crime after 
police found drugs and money in the car he was 
driving. Police found 35 grams of cocaine, a baggie of 
marihuana, $775 and two cell phones in the centre 
console next to the driver’s seat. Two cell phone 
charger cords were also clearly visible in the car. The 
trial judge rejected the evidence of a defence witness 
that he had temporarily loaned his rental car to the 
accused, a man he barely knew. The witness, an 
admitted drug  dealer, essentially claimed ownership of 
the drugs and money and said the accused did not 
know they were in the vehicle. The judge found that 
the quantity and value of the seized drugs made it 
inconceivable that they would be casually entrusted, 
by an admitted drug dealer, to someone who did not 
know what was in the vehicle.  Along with other 
evidence, the judge went on to hold that the accused 
knew the drugs and money were in the vehicle and 
possession had been proven. 
On appeal, the convictions were upheld. Possession 
requires proof that the accused had knowledge of and 
control over the contraband in the car. But suspicion of 
guilt, by itself, is insufficient to establish knowledge of 
the drugs and money to the requisite criminal standard 
of proof. Here, the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected 
the accused’s argument that his mere proximity to the 
concealed drugs and money was the reason he was 
convicted. Although the Crown’s case was not 
overwhelming, the trial judge’s conclusion that the 
accused had knowledge of the contraband was firmly 
anchored in a cumulative view of the evidence and the 
only rational inference in all the circumstances.“The 
evidence at trial established a constellation of factors 
that, taken together, support the inference of 
knowledge by the [accused] of the presence of drugs 
and cash in the car he was driving,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “Moreover, when the car was in fact stopped, 
the [accused] was using his cell phone, which then 
rang  continuously during  the interval when he was 
detained by the police at the roadside (10 missed calls 
were recorded).  This is consistent with individuals 
seeking to engage in drug  transactions. In addition, two 
cell phone charger cords were clearly visible in the 
vehicle, and accessible to the [accused], on the centre 
console next to the driver’s seat.”  The convictions were 
properly supported by an evidentiary foundation and 
the accused’s appeal against conviction was dismissed. 
- R. v. Bryan, 2013 ONCA 97 
Ontario Court of Appeal
DETENTION	 NOT	 TRIGGERED	 JUST	 BECAUSE	 
SUSPECT	 QUESTIONED
At his trial in the Ontario Superior 
C o u r t o f J u s t i c e o n ch i l d 
po rnog raphy and weapons 
charges, the accused made a 
Charter application to exclude two statements he made 
to the police. His first statement (answers to brief police 
questions) was made before his arrest in an office at the 
store where he was an employee and before being 
advised of his Charter rights. He made a second 
statement in the police station after arrest and after 
being advised of his Charter rights. The trial judge 
found the accused was not detained when he gave his 
first statement and was not entitled to receive a s. 10(b) 
warning. The second statement was made after 
appropriate Charter warnings were provided and was 
also admissible. He was convicted of making  child 
pornography available, possessing  and accessing it, 
and possession of a prohibited weapon.
His appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was 
dismissed. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial 
judge applied the correct analytical framework for 
determining  whether there was a detention. “In our 
view, the trial judge was entitled to find on a balance 
of probabilities that the [accused] was not detained,” 
said the Court of Appeal. “His decision was premised 
on the absence of specific hallmarks of detention (e.g. 
the police did not say that the [accused] could not 
leave the store office), the [accused’s] concession that 
he knew it was possible for him to go, and the 
[accused’s] strong  motive for speaking, namely, to 
make sure that his brother was not implicated in his 
criminal activity.” Just because a person is under 
investigation for criminal activity and is asked 
questions, doesn’t mean they are necessarily detained. 
CASE QUOTE
“The evidence at trial established a constellation of 
factors that,  taken together, support the inference of 
knowledge by the [accused] of the presence of drugs and 
cash in the car he was driving.” - R. v. Bryan at para. 10.
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Since the accused’s attack on the admissibility of his 
police station statement was contingent on the 
inadmissibility of his first statement (and the asserted 
taint that flowed), there was no basis for further 
argument. The accused's appeal against his conviction 
was dismissed. - R. v. England, 2013 ONCA 237
Ontario Court of Appeal
CORROBORATED	 INFORMATION	 COMBINED	 
WITH	 OTHER	 EVIDENCE	 JUSTIFIES	 WARRANT
Police obtained a warrant to 
search the accused’s home under 
s. 11 of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act. The ITO included 
information from a first time, non-coded, confidential 
informer who did not want to testify or have his identity 
known because of a belief that serious harm could 
come to him or family members. The affiant personally 
met with the informer and questioned him at length 
regarding  his knowledge of illicit drugs, the methods of 
packaging  those drugs, street pricing, drug terminology 
and methods of ingestion. The affiant found the 
informer quite knowledgeable and successfully 
corroborated information provided through the use of 
background checks, records checks, personal 
knowledge and physical surveillance. When the 
warrant was executed 177 grams of powder cocaine 
and $12,135 in cash was recovered. As a result, the 
accused was charged with cocaine and proceeds of 
crime offences. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
found there was sufficient information provided in the 
ITO to allow the authorizing judge to issue the warrant. 
The accused was convicted of possessing drugs for the 
purpose of trafficking  and possession of proceeds of 
crime. 
The accused then challenged the search, arguing the 
information contained in the ITO was insufficient to 
justify the warrant. Ontario’s top court, however, 
concluded that the information was sufficient. “The 
information provided by the confidential informant was 
corroborated by the police in many details,” said the 
Court of Appeal. “When combined with the drug-
related conversation that ensued when the police 
called the cell phone number the informant had 
provided and the extensive surveillance evidence 
indicating  activity by the [accused] highly suggestive of 
hand-to-hand drug trafficking, the ITO was sufficient to 
provide reasonable and probable grounds necessary for 
the issuance of the warrant.” - R.  v. Bouchard, 2013 
ONCA 229
Ontario Court of Appeal
POSING	 AS	 SPIRITUAL	 ADVISER	 NOT	 A	 DIRTY	 
TRICK
Several people were convicted of 
first degree murder after a man 
was shot several times near his car 
in a parking lot. Key evidence 
against the accused included video and audio tapes 
taken while incriminating  statements were made to an 
undercover police officer posing as an Obeah spiritual 
advisor. A judge of the Ontario Superior Court rejected 
the accuseds’ argument that this method of obtaining 
statements constituted a “dirty trick” and that their 
admission into evidence would constitute an abuse of 
process. In the judge’s view, the police conduct would 
neither shock the conscience of the community nor 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s 
ruling, holding  that the statements should not be 
excluded under the dirty tricks doctrine nor as a result 
of a s. 7 Charter breach. Under the common law there 
are circumstances in which a statement of an accused 
“ought to be excluded because the conduct of the 
police is so egregious that admitting  the evidence 
would bring  the administration of justice into disrepute 
or is so appalling  as to shock the conscience of the 
community.” However, the threshold for finding that a 
police investigative technique rises to the level of a 
dirty trick requiring the exclusion of evidence is high. 
In this case (1) the accuseds were not in custody when 
the statements were made, (2) the Obeah spiritual 
adviser, as an undercover officer, was not a person in 
authority, (3) the accuseds communicated not to fulfill 
a religious purpose or spiritual need but to use the 
advisor’s powers to thwart the police and allow them to 
escape prosecution and (4) admitting  the statements 
would not shock the community’s conscience nor bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. Finally. s. 7 
CASE QUOTE
“Deceit on its own is not enough to constitute a dirty trick. The behaviour must be so egregious that it shocks the 
conscience of the community. In other words, the public would be outraged that police were engaging in such behaviour, 
even in the pursuit of criminals.” - R. v. Welsh at para. 94.
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of the Charter had no application since the accuseds 
were not detained when the statements were made. 
The police operation in this case did not constitute a 
“dirty trick” nor breach s. 7. - R. v.  Welsh, 2013 
ONCA 190
British Columbia Court of Appeal
EVIDENCE	 ADMISSIBLE	 DESPITE	 CHARTER	 
BREACHES
The police obtained a search 
warrant for a premises rented by 
the accused in a business office 
and warehouse complex. They 
approached, announced their presence and detained 
him. A search turned up more than 400 growing 
marihuana plants. The accused was then arrested, 
advised of his right to counsel and transported to the 
police station where he provided a statement. He 
argued before a British Columbia Supreme Court judge 
that the evidence was inadmissible under s. 24(2) of 
the Charter because, among  other reasons, he was not 
advised of his right to consult counsel in a timely 
manner upon arrest. The judge found two s. 10 (b) 
Charter breaches. First, there was an 11 to 14 minute 
delay in advising  the accused of his right to counsel 
after he was detained. Second, although the police 
officer advised the accused that he could contact 
counsel by cell phone, the police did not offer him the 
ability to do so in private in the police car. The judge 
excluded keys and other evidence provided by the 
accused at the scene and later at the police station but 
refused to exclude evidence obtained in the execution 
of the search warrant. He was convicted of producing 
marihuana and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
He appealed his convictions arguing, in part, that the 
evidence of the grow operation ought to be excluded 
on the basis of the s. 10(b) violations. But the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s 
ruling. The trial judge considered the proper factors, 
did not make any unreasonable findings and his 
decision in determining  that the admission of the 
evidence would not bring  the administration of justice 
into disrepute was owed considerable deference. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. - R. v. Camacho, 
2013 BCCA 68
Note-able quote
“The jury consists of twelve  persons chosen to 
decide who has the better lawyer.” - Robert Frost 
Alberta Court of Appeal
COMPLAINANT	 NOT	 PERSON	 IN	 AUTHORITY
The Alberta Court of Appeal has 
upheld a trial judge’s ruling that 
neither the complainant of a 
sexual assault nor her boyfriend 
were persons in authority under the common law 
confessions rule because there was no evidence they 
were connected to the police or prosecution. 
Following  the assault, the accused made three 
statements: the first was to the complainant’s boyfriend 
Charter Breaches?
What were the Charter  violations as found by the 
trial judge?
• s. 10 (a): The accused was not advised 
promptly  of the reasons for his initial detention. 
There was a six  minute delay between his 
detention and when he was given a copy of 
the search warrant, it  was read to him and 
explained that  he was detained for purposes of 
“the execution of the warrant".
• s. 10(b): He was not  advised “without delay” of 
his right  to retain and instruct  counsel. A further 
six  or seven minute delay occurred between 
when he was informed of the reason for 
detention and advising him of the right to 
counsel;
• s. 10(b): He was not  afforded an opportunity  to 
contact counsel using a phone available at 
the scene with as much privacy  as could be 
afforded to a co‑operative accused in the 
backseat of a police car; and
• s. 10(b): He was asked questions about  his 
identity  and for keys to the premises which the 
police wished to search before he had an 
opportunity  to exercise his asserted desire to 
speak to a lawyer.
R. v. Camacho, 2011 BCSC 175.
CASE QUOTE
“As a general proposition, there is no justification for 
refusing access to counsel until the suspect is returned 
to the police station. Exigent circumstances may make 
that reasonable in a particular case but there were no 
such circumstances here. Further, there is no reason why 
[the accused] could not have had the privacy that the 
backseat of a police car affords..” - R. v. Camacho, 2011 
BCSC 175 at para.  44.
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(his roommate); the second to the complainant and her 
boyfriend; and the third to the police the following day. 
The trial judge determined that the confessions rule did 
not apply to the statements made to the boyfriend or 
the complainant as they were not persons in authority. 
In the judge’s view, it was not enough for the 
complainant or her boyfriend to have a basic power to 
influence proceedings by pressing charges. However, 
she exercised her discretion to exclude these 
statements on the ground of trial fairness. She admitted 
into evidence the statement to the police. The accused 
was convicted of sexual assault. 
The Court of Appeal agreed that the statements to the 
complainant and her boyfriend were not made to 
persons in authority. “While the [accused] may have 
believed that the complainant had the ability to 
influence the proceedings against him, in the sense that 
she could decline to report the incident to the police 
and ensure that proceedings were never initiated, there 
was no indication that the [accused] believed the 
complainant was connected to the police or the 
prosecution,” said the Court of Appeal. “In fact, he did 
not know at that time that the incident had even been 
reported, and the complainant testified that he 
specifically asked her not to contact the police. The 
[accused] did not testify on the voir dire, so there was 
no direct evidence that he believed her to be a person 
in authority, and the balance of the evidence did not 
compel that inference”. The accused had failed to meet 
his evidential burden of establishing that he reasonably 
believed that the complainant was connected to the 
state. Similarly, there was no evidence of any 
collaboration between the boyfriend and police. As for 
the statement to police, it was not tainted by the 
inducements given by the complainant and her 
boyfriend. There was a gap between the statements, 
they were made to different people and, at the 
beginning  of the interview, the detective told the 
accused that any inducements not to report the offence 
to police were no longer operative. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. - R.  v.  Glessman, 2013 ABCA 
86 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
ESSENTIAL	 FEATURE	 OF	 SEXUAL	 ACT	 REQUIRES	 
CONSENT
The accused, fearing his intimate 
partner might leave him, decided 
to surreptitiously sabotage their 
birth control method. By poking 
holes in the condoms they used, he hoped that his 
partner would get pregnant and she would then 
continue the relationship. She did get pregnant and 
ended up aborting the baby. The accused was 
convicted in Nova Scotia Supreme Court of sexual 
assault and sentenced to 18 months in jail. The judge 
found the complainant did not consent to having 
unprotected sex. The accused knew full well that she 
did not want to become pregnant and she insisted he 
wear a condom for that very reason. 
A panel of five Newfoundland Court of Appeal judges 
agreed that .Under s. 273.1(1) of the Criminal Code, 
consent means “the voluntary agreement of the 
complainant to engage in the sexual activity in 
question.” Just what is meant by the words “the sexual 
activity in question?” Was the sexual activity in 
question simply sexual intercourse as the accused 
argued, to which the complainant did give consent? Or 
was the sexual activity in question unprotected sexual 
intercourse as the Crown argued, which the 
complainant did not give consent? By a 4-1 majority, 
the Court of Appeal concluded that consent under s. 
273.1(1) requires the alleged victim to be fully aware of 
the exact nature of the proposed sexual activity. “If 
there is no consent to an essential feature of the sexual 
act itself, there can be no consent to ‘the sexual activity 
in question’ pursuant to s. 273.1,” said Chief Justice 
MacDonald. “It is clear that protected sex was an 
essential feature of the proposed sexual act and an 
inseparable component of [the complainant’s] 
consent.” The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction and sentence were upheld. - R. v. 
Hutchinson, 2013 NSCA 1.
Note-able quote
“Make crime pay. Become a lawyer.” - Will Rogers 
CASE QUOTE
“Under the common law confessions rule, the accused must be 
able point to some evidence showing that the receiver of the 
statement was a person in authority. If that is done, the Crown 
must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statement 
was voluntary. However, voluntariness  does  not become an issue 
if  the receiver of the  statement is not a person in authority. ... 
The confessions rule requires that a statement be made to 
persons in authority for the purpose of controlling coercive state 
conduct. For this reason, the term “person in authority” usually 
applies to “those persons formally engaged in the arrest, 
detention, examination or prosecution of  the accused”. - R. v. 
Glessman at para. 8-9, references omitted. 
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CANADA: By the Numbers
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
 402
Quebec Provincial Police
 5,588
Ontario Provincial Police
 4,266
Canada’s Largest Municipal Police Services 2012
Service Officers % Female
Actual Authorized
Toronto, ON 5,568 5,574 19%
Montreal, QC 4,480 4,597 31%
Calgary,  AB 1,975 1,960 15%
Peel Reg., ON 1,911 1,937 17%
Edmonton,  AB 1,603 1,647 19%
Winnipeg, MN 1,472 1,441 14%
York Reg., ON 1,454 1,495 18%
Vancouver, BC 1,352 1,327 22%
Ottawa, ON 1,312 1,363 23%
Durham Reg., ON 923 871 18%
POLICING	 ACROSS	 CANADA:	 
FACTS	 &	 FIGURES
According  to a report released 
by Statistics Canada, there were 
69,539 active police officers 
across Canada in 2012 - a slight 
increase of 115 over 2011. This 
was the ninth consecutive year 
of growth. Ontario had the most police officers at 
26,274, while the  Yukon had the least at 119. With a 
national population of 34,880,491, Canada’s average 
cop per pop  rate was 199 police officers per 100,000 
residents. This rate was lower than Scotland (337), 
England and Wales (244), the United States (238), 
Australia (222), Japan (201) and New Zealand (201). 
Total population: 34,880,491
Source: Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 
2012, Catalogue no:  85-225-X, March 2013
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CMA Police Officers & Crime Severity Index
CMA Officers-2012 Crime Severity 
Index-2010
Toronto, ON 10,023 54.9
Montreal, QC 6,986 80.9
Vancouver, BC 3,950 94.5
Calgary, AB 2,081 65.8
Edmonton, AB 1,928 89.4
Winnipeg, MN 1,517 107.2
Ottawa, ON 1,402 57.9
Hamilton, ON 1,129 65.2
Quebec, QC 998 52.2
Kitchener-Cambridge-Waterloo, ON 802 62.9
London, ON 769 79.0
St. Catherines-Niagara, ON 737 60.7
Halifax, NS 698 87.4
Windsor, ON 589 62.5
Victoria, BC 552 71.3
Saskatoon, SK 497 118.7
Gatineau, QC 435 63.6
Regina, SK 422 124.5
St. John’s, NL 336 93.3
Barrie, ON 313 58.3
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 262 87.9
Greater Sudbury, ON 262 78.9
Sherbrooke, QC 250 60.7
Brantford, ON 245 92.2
Kingston, ON 234 59.5
Thunder Bay, ON 228 107.3
Kelowna, BC 206 97.4
Saint John, NB 195 79.2
Guelph, ON 194 47.0
Peterborough, ON 189 62.2
Trois-Rivieres, QC 189 67.9
Saguenay, QC 179 71.1
Moncton, NB 145 68.8
GENDER
There were 13,838 female officers in 2012 
accounting  for 19.9% of all officers, or roughly  1 
in 5. This is up from 17.9% in 2006, 14.5% in 
2001, 10.4% in 1996, 7.0% in 
1991, 3.9% in 1986, and 2.2% in 
1980. Quebec had the highest 
percentage of women (23.9%) 
while the Yukon had the least 
(12.6%). The RCMP HQ and 
Training  Academy were 22.4% 
female. 
The number of women in all 
ranks continued to rise. Senior 
officers were 9.9% female, more 
than doubling  over the last ten 
years. Non-commissioned officers 
were 16.4% female, also more 
than twice the percentage from a 
decade ago. Constables were 
21.8% female. This is a slight 
increase over last year. 
Overall, the representation of 
women in policing  continues to 
increase. In 2012 the number of 
women increased (+234) while 
the number of male officers 
decreased (-119). 
Area % 
Female
QC 23.9%
BC 21.3%
NL 19.1%
ON 18.7%
SK 18.5%
AB 17.3%
NS 16.8%
PEI 17.0%
NB 15.6%
MN 15.4%
NU 12.8%
NWT 13.1%
YK 12.6%
OTHER	 FA$T	 FACT$
• Police expenditures rose for the 17th 
consecutive year, more than doubling  since 
1994;
• Costs for policing  translates to $375 per 
Canadian;
• Among  provinces, Ontario spent the most on 
policing  ($4,326,213,000)  followed by Quebec 
( $ 2 , 3 9 0 , 0 4 2 , 0 0 0 ) , B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a 
($1,434,524,000), Alberta ($1,224,920,000) and 
Mani toba ($395,745,000) . The Yukon 
($26 ,231 ,000 ) , P r ince Edward I s l and 
($32,024,000), Nunavut ($42,636,000) and the 
Northwest Territories ($50,918,000)  spent the 
least
Based on total expenditures on policing in 2011.
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Canada’s Largest Municipal RCMP Detachments 2011
Service Officers % Female
Actual Authorized
Surrey, BC 615 641 20%
Burnaby, BC 299 278 25%
Richmond, BC 228 227 21%
Kelowna,  BC 154 157 25%
Wood Buffalo, AB 150 158 26%
Coquitlam,  BC 149 144 26%
Nanaimo, BC 145 139 19%
Codiac Region, NB 142 131 19%
Red Deer,  AB 128 151 29%
Langley Township, BC 127 127 27%
Kamloops, BC 127 122 24%
Prince George, BC 124 127 25%
Chilliwack, BC 108 103 33%
RCMP
The RCMP had the largest presence in 
British Columbia  with 6,270 officers, 
followed by Alberta (2,810), Ontario 
(1,469) and Saskatchewan (1,265).
RCMP On-Strength Establishment         
as of September 1, 2011
Rank #	 of	 positions
Commissioner 1
Deputy Commissioners 9
Assistant Commissioners 25
Chief Superintendents 51
Superintendents 186
Inspectors 440
Corps Sergeant Major 1
Sergeants Major 3
Staff Sergeants Major 16
Staff Sergeants 942
Sergeants 2,140
Corporals 3,672
Constables 11,717
Special Constables 78
Civilian Members 3,760
Public Servants 6,194
Total 29,235
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm
According to Statistics Canada, the majority of RCMP 
officers provided provincial police services (6,830). This 
was followed by RCMP municipal policing  (5,117) and 
federal policing (4,447). Another 1,681 officers were 
involved in RCMP Headquarters and the Training 
Academy. 
RCMP Officers by Level of Policing - Canada 2012 (numbers do not include 1,681 members at HQ & Training Academy)
Level / Region BC AB SK MN ON QC NB NS PEI NL YK NWT NU Total
Municipal 3,472 1,060 122 190 - - 202 62 9 - - - - 5,117
Provincial 1,825 1,331 855 649 - - 526 744 105 412 94 176 113 6,830
Federal 811 359 245 199 1,377 964 151 194 25 86 17 13 6 4,447
Other 162 60 43 34 92 46 32 43 10 26 8 10 6 572
Total 6,270 2,810 1,265 1,072 1,469 1,010 911 1,043 149 524 119 199 125 16,966
Volume 13 Issue 3 - May/June 2013
PAGE 22
The RCMP is Canada’s largest police 
organization. As of September 1, 
2011 the force’s on-strength 
establishment was 29,235. This 
includes 19,203 police officers, 
78  special constables, 3,760 
civilian members and 6,194 
public servants.
The RCMP is divided into 15 Divisions with 
Headquarters in Ottawa. Each division is managed 
by a commanding  officer and is designated 
alphabetically. 
RCMP DIVISIONS
Region Division Area
Pacific E British Columbia
M Yukon Territory
North West D Manitoba
F Saskatchewan
G Northwest Territories
V Nunavut Territory
K Alberta
Depot Regina, SK
Central A National Capital Region
O Ontario
C Quebec
Atlantic B Newfoundland
H Nova Scotia
J New Brunswick
L Prince Edward Island
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm
• In 2011, police reported 97,500 
victims of  intimate partner violence.
• 80% of  spousal violence victims 
were female.
• Violence against dating partners 
was 1.6 times greater that spousal 
violence.
• Highest rates of  family violence were 
recorded in Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba. The lowest rates were 
recorded in Ontario, PEI, Nova 
Scotia and BC.
• 77% of  the 344 murder-suicides in 
Canada between 2001-2011 
involved at least one victim related 
to the accused.
• Shooting (53%) was the most 
common cause of  death in spousal 
murder-suicides. Stabbing followed 
at 22%.
• Risk of  spousal homicide was 
elevated after separation from a 
legal marriage.
• Majority of  intimate partner violence 
victims were physically assaulted.
• Common assault was the most 
frequently occurring offence.
FAMILY VIOLENCE FAST FACTS
Source: Statistics Canada, Family violence in Canada: A 
statistical profile, 2011, Catalogue no:  85-002-X, June 2013
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ALL	 CIRCUMSTANCES	 TO	 BE	 
CONSIDERED	 IN	 s.	 10(b)	 
ANALYSIS
R. v. Adamiak, 2013 ABCA 199
Following  a police investigation, the 
accused was arrested during  a traffic 
stop  at 1:30 pm for possessing  drugs 
for the purpose of trafficking. He was 
read the  standard Charter caution and 
was asked if he  understood. He said he did, but 
answered “No” when asked whether he wanted to 
call a  a lawyer. He was then told that he might be 
charged with possession for the purpose of 
trafficking  and that he was not obliged to say 
anything, but if he did it might be used in evidence 
against him. He was transported to the police station 
and was locked in a small cell. He never asked to 
use a  telephone or contact a lawyer. After the police 
executed a search warrant at 10:00 pm at his home, 
he was given a telephone and told he could call a 
lawyer. The first number he called did not work but 
the second time he reached someone, speaking  for 
about 10 minutes. Telephone books, a legal aid 
poster and lists of lawyers were located in the 
holding  area outside the cell where the telephones 
were located. At about 11:30 pm the  accused was 
taken to an interview room and asked if he had 
spoken with a lawyer. He said, “No. I just really 
wanted to talk to my girlfriend.” He acknowledged 
he had been given the opportunity to call someone 
and was again Chartered and asked if he wished to 
call a  lawyer. He replied, “At this moment no.” A 25 
minute audio/video taped interview was conducted 
and he gave an inculpatory statement. At the 
accused’s home police found, among  other items, an 
insulated cooler containing  793 grams of marihuana 
in six  separate  bags along  with a digital scale. He 
was charged with possessing  marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking.
Alberta Provincial Court
The judge ruled that the accused’s s. 10(b) 
Charter right to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay had been violated. She 
found that regardless of what happened at 
the time of the  accused's arrest when he was given 
his s. 10(b)  rights and chose not to exercise them at 
that point, the accused’s response  some 10 hours 
later at the beginning  of the interview was equivocal 
- it was not a clear waiver or denial of the right to 
counsel. The officer should have gone further, 
determined the  accused’s understanding  of his rights 
and ensure that it was a clear refusal or waiver of the 
right to counsel. The judge then excluded the 
accused's statement under s. 24(2) and he was 
acquitted. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The Crown asserted that the trial 
judge was in error when she found 
the s. 10(b) Charter breach. In its 
view, the police fulfilled their s. 10
(b)  duties and the accused made no effort to assert 
his right to counsel nor provide evidence that he did 
not understand his rights. 
The Court of Appeal first recognized three 
obligations imposed on police under s. 10(b):
1. the duty to inform a detainee of his right to 
counsel (INFORMATIONAL); 
2. if a detainee has indicated a desire to exercise 
this right, a duty to provide the detainee with a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise the right 
(IMPLEMENTATIONAL); and 
3. the duty to refrain from eliciting  evidence from 
the detainee until they have a reasonable 
opportunity to consult (IMPLEMENTATIONAL).
Once the police have complied with s. 10(b) by 
promptly  advising  the detainee of their right to 
counsel without delay, the second and third 
implementational duties are not triggered unless and 
until a detainee indicates a desire to exercise their 
right to counsel. The detainee must also be 
reasonably diligent in exercising  their right. If they 
are not, the correlative  duty on the police to provide 
a reasonable opportunity and to refrain from 
eliciting  evidence will either not arise in the first 
place or will be suspended. Section 10(b) rights may 
be waived but the standard for proving  a waiver will 
be high, especially when the waiver is implicit. 
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In this case, the trial judge focussed exclusively on 
the accused’s interaction with the police 
immediately before he gave an inculpatory 
statement. Instead, she should have examined the 
totality  of the circumstances in assessing  whether s.
10(b) was breached, including  from the time of his 
initial arrest until he gave the inculpatory statement:
Among other things, the trial judge needed to 
take account of the Charter warning given to the 
[accused] at the roadside; his assurance to the 
arresting  officer that he understood his rights and 
did not wish to contact a lawyer; his later access 
to and use of a telephone after being told that he 
could call a lawyer; whether his jeopardy had 
changed between the original caution and the 
later one; and his acknowledgment to the 
interviewing officer that he had been given the 
chance to call a lawyer. 
                                                                                            
Although the trial judge found as a fact that the 
[accused] made an equivocal statement when 
asked, immediately before the interview, 
whether he wished to contact a lawyer, not 
every equivocal statement necessarily leads to a 
breach of section 10(b). The totality of the 
circumstances must be considered. [paras. 
27-28]
The trial judge failed to conduct a  complete analysis 
on the s. 10(b)  issue and her application of s. 24(2) 
was flawed. The  Crown’s appeal was allowed and a 
new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
NO	 OPPORTUNITY	 TO	 COMPLY	 
WITH	 s.	 10(b):	 OVERHEARD	 
CONVERSATION	 ADMISSIBLE
R. v. Abdullah, 2013 ONCA 372
Following  the accused’s arrest for 
several offences arising  out of the 
search of his home, including 
possessing  a handgun, he was 
advised of his right to counsel by  the 
investigating  detective while in police cells.  He 
asserted his right to counsel, indicating  that he 
wished to speak to his lawyer and identified his 
lawyer by name. However, within seconds he began 
a conversation with the person in the next cell as the 
detective was leaving  the cellblock to arrange access 
to a lawyer.  The detective stopped, listened and 
made notes of the  very brief conversation, which 
was potentially inculpatory. After listening  to and 
recording  the  statement, the detective interviewed 
another person involved in the same investigation 
and then began his efforts to locate the accuseds’s 
lawyer some 20 to 25 minutes after he asserted his s. 
10(b)  Charter right.  Those efforts failed.  The 
detective then spoke to the  accused again and 
offered to arrange for him to speak to another 
lawyer.  Eventually, the accused waived his right to 
counsel and provided a videotaped statement to the 
police.  
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The trial judge ruled the videotaped 
statement admissible but excluded the 
statement made to the other prisoner as 
recorded by the detective. He held that 
the detective delayed affording  the accused the 
opportunity to exercise his right to counsel for no 
valid reason and the delay was therefore not 
reasonable.  The accused’s right under s. 10(b)  was 
breached and the evidence was excluded under s. 
24(2). “[I]nstead of doing  what he should have done, 
and do what is necessary to find counsel for the 
accused, [the detective] made a conscious decision 
to delay the implementation of the right to counsel 
for the purposes of doing  other things, interviewing  a 
third party and, of course, also eavesdropping  to 
obtain incriminating  evidence,” said the judge. The 
accused was acquitted.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown’s challenge of the trial 
judge’s Charter ruling  on the s. 10
(b)  breach was successful. Of the 
three  obligations imposed on the 
police under s. 10(b), the one at issue in this case 
was the police duty to provide the detainee with a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise his right to retain 
and instruct counsel without delay. Here, the 
detective listened to and recorded notes of the  brief 
conversation between the accused and the other 
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prisoner before leaving  the  cell area. “The statement 
was made by the [accused] to the other prisoner 
before the detective had any  possible opportunity  to 
comply with the request for counsel,” said the Court 
of Appeal. “Even if the brief 20-25 minute delay 
after the officer left the cell area could engage s. 10
(b)  concerns, that time period is irrelevant to 
whether there was a breach at the time the officer 
listened to and made notes of the statement. There 
was no breach of s. 10(b) at that point in time.” It 
added:
In summary, it could not be said that at the point 
in time when the statement was overheard by 
the police officer there had been any failure to 
provide a reasonable opportunity to consult with 
counsel. The [accused’s] belief that his statement 
to the other prisoner was not being overheard by 
the police had no relevance to whether the 
police had complied with their obligation under 
s. 10(b).  [para. 9]
Moreover, the statement came as a  surprise to the 
detective and there could be no suggestion that it 
was in any way elicited by the detective. Had the 
statement been admitted, the  verdict may have been 
different so the acquittals were quashed and a new 
trial was ordered.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
REASONABLE	 GROUNDS	 DOES	 
NOT	 REQUIRE	 50%	 STATISTICAL	 
PROBABILITY
Allen v. Alberta, 2013 ABCA 187    
 
A patrol officer arrested a man in the 
alley behind a  hotel for possessing  a 
controlled substance after finding  him 
smoking  a marijuana cigarette. He 
was handcuffed and the officer tried 
to frisk him but he was uncooperative. He was then 
transported to a  nearby police station where he was 
directed to remove his clothing  down to his 
underwear. The officer wanted to see  if the man was 
in possession of any more drugs. The man complied 
and the officer searched his clothing  for more drugs. 
The man was released from custody without any 
charges being  laid and later complained about 
police conduct. As a result, the officer was charged 
with two disciplinary  offences including  unlawful or 
unnecessary exercise of authority for unnecessarily 
detaining, transporting  and conducting  a modified 
strip search.
 
Presiding Officer
 
At the officer’s hearing, the Presenting 
Officer alleged the strip search was 
unlawful because there was insufficient 
information upon which to justify  it. In his 
view, the officer did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe the person was in 
possession of weapons or evidence and, in the 
alternative, simple possession of marihuana is too 
minor an offence to justify a  strip search. The officer, 
on the other hand, argued that the only reason a 
strip search occurred was because the complainant 
refused to cooperate with a  simple frisk search. He 
opined that he should not have to give up a 
reasonable search just because the man would not 
cooperate. Furthermore, the officer suggested that 
the search was a “modified” strip search because he 
did not intend to expose the  complainant's private 
areas. 
The Presiding  Officer found that there was no 
justification for taking  the complainant to the police 
station for a more intensive search. In his view, once 
the complainant was handcuffed in the alley behind 
the hotel, he was under sufficient police control to 
conduct the limited type  of frisk search that was 
warranted by the circumstances of this arrest. He 
concluded that the search was a “strip search,” 
regardless of the officer’s subjective intention not to 
inspect the complainant's private  parts, and a higher 
level of justification was required for the greater 
invasion of privacy resulting  from a strip search. 
The Presiding  Officer concluded that the officer may 
have had a suspicion the complainant possessed 
more drugs but he did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds. While a frisk search upon arrest 
was reasonable, the further strip  search at the station 
was not. The disciplinary offence of unlawful or 
unnecessary exercise of authority was substantiated. 
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Law Enforcement Review Board
 
The officer appealed the Presiding 
Officer's decision to Alberta’s Law 
Enforcement Review Board arguing 
he erred in his interpretation of what 
constituted a “strip  search,” and what was required 
to show reasonable and probable grounds. However, 
the Board agreed this was a strip  search and calling 
it a “modified” strip  search didn’t matter. It also 
agreed that “mere suspicion” was insufficient to 
support a search and, while the officer had 
“possible” grounds, he did not have “probable” 
grounds. The Presiding  Officer’s decision was 
upheld.
 
Alberta Court of Appeal
 
The officer then appealed 
the Law Enforcement 
Review Board’s decision 
arguing  several grounds, 
including  whether this was a  strip search 
and whether objective probability of 
finding  drugs was required in order to 
conduct the search.  
 
Was this a strip search?
The Court of Appeal noted that personal 
searches are generally divided into three 
categories: frisk, strip  and cavity. These 
analytical descriptions, however, are not 
distinct watertight compartments or 
categories. The Court stated:
Even within these categories, there are degrees 
of intensity. A frisk search can be superficial, or 
can involve the touching of sexually sensitive 
parts of the body. A strip search can be more or 
less invasive, depending on how much, and 
which, clothing is removed.
 
How the intensity of a search is measured does 
not depend on the subjective intention of the 
searcher. In other words, it is not necessary to 
show that the searcher intended to visibly 
inspect the subject’s private parts in order to 
have a “strip search”. Some viewing of the body 
of the person is inevitable whenever clothing is 
removed, and the consequent invasion of 
privacy and personal dignity is the same 
regardless of the intentions of the searcher. 
Obviously if the search arose from some sort of 
lascivious motivation it would be unreasonable, 
but ... strip searches are generally viewed as 
unpleasant by the police officers conducting 
them.
 
The key issue when measuring  the acceptability 
of police conduct is to determine the 
reasonableness of the search, not to attempt to 
place it in any rigid category. A search is 
reasonable when it is authorized by law, and it is 
carried out in a reasonable fashion. The police 
have an established common law right on arrest 
to conduct a search for weapons and evidence. 
However, the method by 
w h i c h t h e s e a r c h i s 
conducted must also be 
reasonable. Sometimes it will 
be reasonable to conduct a 
strip search, and sometimes it 
will not, and when a strip 
search is reasonable it must 
be conducted in a reasonable 
way, and at a reasonable time 
and place. The intensity of 
any search, whether it be a 
frisk search or a strip search, 
must also be reasonable. 
Reasonableness must be 
assessed having regard to all 
of the facts, including the 
seriousness of the crime, the 
level of risk the police and 
public are exposed to, and 
any o the r f ac to r s . The 
intensity and manner of 
conducting the search must 
be proportionate to the circumstances. 
[references omitted, paras. 17-19]
 
Here, the search could fairly be described as a 
“modified strip  search.” While it fell more closely 
into the analytical category of a strip  search as 
defined in R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, it did not 
involve total disrobement. “The complainant was not 
required to remove all of his clothes, but he was left 
with only his underwear on,” said the  Court. “One 
can therefore envision both more intensive and less 
intensive strip  searches than occurred in this case.” 
But whether or not the Presenting  Officer had 
proven on a balance of probabilities that this type or 
“Sometimes it will be 
reasonable to conduct a 
strip search, and 
sometimes it will not, and 
when a strip search is 
reasonable it must be 
conducted in a 
reasonable way, and at a 
reasonable time and 
place. The intensity of 
any search, whether it be 
a frisk search or a strip 
search, must also be 
reasonable.”
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intensity of search was unnecessary, did not only 
depend on how the search was categorized:
 
In this case [the officer] had a choice. He could 
have conducted a more intensive frisk search, 
which would have involved a sustained touching 
of the complainant’s body while searching his 
clothing. Alternatively, he could have proceeded 
as he did, and have the complainant remove his 
outer clothing  at the police station. This enabled 
[the officer] to search the clothing without 
touching  the complainant. There was a trade off 
between actual touching  and the exposure 
resulting  from the removal of clothing. On this 
issue, the views of the person to be searched 
would be relevant. There were other relevant 
factors, such as the location of the arrest, the 
seriousness of the charges, and the rest of the 
factual context. The essential question was 
whether the Presenting Officer had proven on a 
balance of probabilities that the choice made by 
[the officer] was unreasonable, making the 
search an unnecessary exercise of authority. If 
the merits and disadvantages of each choice 
were roughly balanced, it would not necessarily 
have been unreasonable for [the officer] to 
choose to proceed as he did, even if the 
Presiding Officer or the Board may have made a 
different choice. [para. 23]
 
Did the search require objective probability?
The second question the Alberta Court of Appeal 
addressed was whether the  search required advance 
objective probability  of finding  narcotics and if it 
did, whether that meant greater than a 50% 
statistical probability. In this case, the Court found 
that both the Presiding  Officer and Law Enforcement 
Review Board erred in assuming  that the officer had 
to demonstrate there was a probability he would find 
further drugs:
[T]he arresting  officer must subjectively believe 
he has grounds, and that subjective belief must 
be objectively justifiable. “Reasonable and 
probable grounds” therefore explores whether 
the arresting  officer’s subjective belief that there 
was a probability (beyond mere suspicion) that 
he would find further evidence was reasonable, 
even if it was not demonstrably statistically 
probable, and even if a reviewing  court or 
tribunal (with the benefit of hindsight and 
careful reflection) might not agree. [reference 
omitted, para. 27]
 
The officer in this case subjectively believed that a 
search was warranted. The issue then became 
whether the Presenting  Officer had proven on a 
balance of probabilities that an informed objective 
bystander would consider it unreasonable for the 
officer to hold that belief. For greater clarity, ‘the 
police do not have to show an ‘objective 
probability’, nor a  ‘50% statistical probability’, in 
order to establish reasonable and probable 
grounds”:
  
The real question was whether the Presenting 
Officer had proven on a balance of probabilities 
that the search was unreasonable. That involved 
proving  that it was objectively unreasonable for 
[the officer] to believe that the search was a 
reasonable thing to do. The objective component 
of the test is not that it is probable that drugs, 
weapons or other evidence will be found, but 
rather that it is objectively reasonable to go 
looking. [para. 31]
 
Since the Law Enforcement Review Board erred in 
deciding  that “reasonable and probable grounds” 
required a probability of finding  more drugs, the 
officer’s appeal was allowed and the matter was 
remitted back to the Board for reconsideration. “The 
background issue was whether a  search of this 
intensity was unnecessary, not whether the  search 
qualified in the abstract as a  ‘strip  search’,” said the 
Court. “Considering  all the circumstances, the 
search may have been reasonable and necessary 
even if there  was not an objective probability that 
more drugs would be found.”
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
“Reasonable and probable grounds” therefore explores whether the arresting officer’s 
subjective belief that there was a probability (beyond mere suspicion) that he would find further 
evidence was reasonable, even if it was not demonstrably statistically probable, and even if a 
reviewing court or tribunal (with the benefit of hindsight and careful reflection) might not agree.
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REASONABLE	 GROUNDS	 
VIEWED	 THROUGH	 OFFICER’S	 
LENS
R. v. Moore, 2012 BCCA 400
 
Police received a complaint from a 
local store manager of increased 
drug  activity in the  area around a Sky 
Train Station. The activity described 
was consistent with the investigating 
officer’s own experience, which was considerable 
(300+ drug  investigations), concerning  the manner 
in which dial-a-dope drug  trafficking  occurs. 
Surveillance was conducted in the area  on two 
separate occasions and activity consistent with dial-
a-dope drug  trafficking  was observed. Pedestrians 
were seen to enter a car, stay a short time, exit and 
leave the area or return to the Sky Train station. On 
one occasion, police stopped a person believed to 
be a buyer. They said they  had purchased drugs from 
someone in a vehicle. 
On the final day of surveillance two police officers 
in an unmarked police car were approached by  a 
man within minutes of their arrival in the area. The 
man tried to enter the police car. When he could not 
enter, he asked the officers what they were selling, 
indicated he would wait for his “regular guy”, and 
asked the officers for their number so he could buy 
from them in the future. He then returned to a spot 
next to the stairs at the Sky Train station. About 10 
minutes later the man approached a Volvo that had 
just arrived in the area. The man entered the front 
passenger seat. The lead investigator directed an 
arrest and the surveillance team moved in and 
arrested the vehicle  occupants. Police seized two 
$20 bills from the accused’s lap and 41 pieces of 
rock cocaine from a prescription pill box in the 
centre console. A cell phone, which rang 
continuously, and a  black purse with $150 was also 
seized. He was charged with trafficking offences.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused argued that the  police did 
not have the requisite subjective and 
objective grounds to arrest him and 
therefore the contemporaneous search of 
his vehicle and seizure of cocaine violated his right 
to be secure against unreasonable search and 
seizure under s. 8 of the Charter. The judge found 
the officer subjectively believed he had the grounds 
to make the arrest, but lacked the objective grounds 
such that there was a s. 8  breach. In his view, there 
were insufficient grounds to conclude the driver of 
the Volvo was a drug  dealer such that a drug 
transaction had occurred or was about to occur. 
However, the judge held the officer had sufficient 
grounds for an investigative detention, thus the 
accused’ rights under s.  9 of the Charter were not 
infringed. In his s. 24(2)  analysis on the s. 8  breach, 
the judge admitted the evidence. The officer held an 
honest belief that he had reasonable grounds to 
direct an arrest and acted in good faith. There were 
grounds for an investigative detention and the search 
was conducted reasonably. The accused was 
convicted of trafficking  in cocaine and possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused contended that the 
judge erred in finding  he had not 
been arbitrary detained under s. 9 
of the Charter. Furthermore, he 
argued the judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis. The 
Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the arrest 
was objectively reasonable and, in any event, the 
evidence was properly admitted. 
Arrest
For an arrest to be lawful, the arresting  officer must 
have a subjective belief that an indictable offence 
has been or is about to be committed, and the 
grounds for their belief must be objectively 
“[T]he objective reasonableness of grounds must be determined on the totality of the 
circumstances and is a question to be assessed from the point of a reasonable person with 
the officer’s experience, training, knowledge and skills.”
Volume 13 Issue 3 - May/June 2013
PAGE 29
reasonable. As for whether the objective test has 
been met, “the objective  reasonableness of grounds 
must be determined on the totality of the 
circumstances and is a  question to be assessed from 
the point of a reasonable person with the officer’s 
experience, training, knowledge and skills.” Here, 
objective reasonableness was to be viewed from the 
perspective of “a reasonable person standing  in the 
shoes of [the officer] with his considerable 
experience in drug  investigations, his training, his 
knowledge and his skills.” Justice Saunder’s also 
noted:
Each case must be determined on its own facts, 
considering the extent of the police’s direct 
knowledge, the extent and duration of their 
observations, the nature of the complaint, the 
events and timing of the transaction, other 
sources of information and such other relevant 
factors as may be present. [para. 19]
In this case, the Court of Appeal found it was 
objectively reasonable for police to conclude the 
man’s conversation with them concerned the 
purchase of drugs and that he was waiting  for his 
regular supplier of drugs. “Further, the nature of the 
encounter indicated a purchaser seeking  to buy 
drugs from a mobile dispenser, consistent with a 
dial-a-dope transaction,” said Justice Saunders “On 
this event, in my view, it was objectively reasonable 
for [the officer] to form the conclusion that the next 
vehicle that the man got into was probably his 
regular dealer.” Then, when then accused’s Volvo 
arrived, the man’s “behaviour was consistent with 
behaviour in dial-a-dope transactions, was 
consistent with behaviours seen at the Sky Train 
station during  the surveillance, and was consistent 
with this individual’s approach to the two police 
officers when he had attempted to enter their vehicle 
before engaging  the conversation about purchasing 
drugs.” 
Finally, the lead investigator’s decision to instruct his 
surveillance team to stop the next vehicle that the 
man entered did not indicate an arbitrariness that 
contradicted the existence of objectively reasonable 
grounds for arrest. In Justice Saunder’s view, this 
evidence required a sensible review:
It would be nonsensical to consider that [the 
officer’s] decision, and instruction, were to be 
applied literally without consideration of the 
reasonableness of the next vehicle being  one 
involved in a dial-a-dope transaction. As we 
know, the next vehicle was not, for example, an 
ambulance or marked police car, but rather a 
vehicle much like those observed during the 
surveillance. Indeed, it was a grey Volvo similar 
to one observed the preceding day. [para. 19]
The accused’s Charter rights had not been violated 
by his arrest and the subsequent search of his 
vehicle and seizure of cocaine was lawful. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
ARRESTEE	 WAIVED	 RIGHT	 TO	 
COUNSEL:
NO	 s.	 10(b)	 BREACH	 
R. v. Quesnelle, 2013 ONCA 180
After the accused was arrested at his 
laundry shop for sexual offences and 
robbery, he was advised of his right 
to counsel and cautioned that 
anything  he said could be used 
against him in court. He said he would like to speak 
to a lawyer. In the police car while being  transported 
to the police station he was again advised of his right 
to counsel and cautioned. Again, he reiterated his 
desire  to speak to counsel. Upon arrival at the police 
station, he was advised that he could call a lawyer of 
his choice or speak to Duty Counsel for free. This 
time he said he just wanted to speak to the 
investigating  detective. Then at the outset of a 
videotaped interview, the detective again told the 
accused he could call his lawyer or, if he  didn’t have 
one, could call legal aid or duty counsel. A 
discussion they ensued about whether he was only 
arrested or charged with a crime. He said this, “If 
I’ve just been arrested for this crime ... I have no 
problems talking  with, if you’re charging  me with it I 
want to speak to a  lawyer please.” The detective 
replied, “At this stage of the game you’ve  just been 
arrested.” The  accused then declined a further 
opportunity to speak to counsel and provided a 
statement. 
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Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Although he  had been advised four 
times of his right to counsel and 
cautioned that anything  he did say could 
be used against him in court, the 
accused argued that he asked to speak to counsel 
twice before giving  his statement and was denied the 
opportunity to exercise that right. He submitted that 
police encouraged him to speak to them before he 
had a chance to speak to a lawyer. The Crown, on 
the other hand, contended that the accused had 
been read his right to counsel and cautioned four 
times before giving  his videotaped statement. He 
was fully aware that any statement could be used 
against him in court and confirmed the  waiver of his 
right to counsel at the  outset of the videotaped 
statement. The judge  concluded there were no 
promises or inducements made and the  accused was 
well-aware  of his right to speak to counsel before he 
said anything  to police. He waived his right to 
counsel in favour of his immediate desire to speak 
without regard for the consequences. There was no 
s. 10(b)  breach, the statement was admissible and 
the accused was convicted on two counts each of 
sexual assault and assault. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among  other 
grounds, that the trial judge erred 
in admitting  his statement. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal, however, 
held that the trial judge considered the relevant 
circumstances and properly applied the law in 
determining  whether the statement was admissible. 
The Appeal Court also found it worth noting  that the 
accused was videotaped saying  he did not need to 
speak to a lawyer so long  as he had only  been 
arrested, not charged. This ground of appeal was 
dismissed but the accused’s conviction appeal was 
allowed on other grounds. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
CROWN	 BEARS	 BURDEN	 OF	 
ESTABLISHING	 STATEMENT’S	 
VOLUNTARINESS
R. v. Wilkinson, 2013 SKCA 46
As a result of a drug  trafficking 
investigation, the police stopped 
t h e a c c u s e d ’s ve h i c l e a n d 
questioned him at roadside. He 
admitted to possessing  marijuana 
and his vehicle was searched. A 
small bag  of marijuana was found in plain view. He 
was arrested, transported to the police station and 
searched. A baggie containing  one ounce of cocaine 
was found hidden in his sock. He contacted legal 
aid and then, about 17 1/2 hours after his arrest, he 
was interviewed. During  his statement he  admitted 
that he intended to sell the cocaine. He was charged 
with possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The trial judge concluded that the Crown 
had failed to discharge its burden in 
proving  that the accused’s statement was 
voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The judge noted that the Crown had not called any 
evidence regarding  the interaction between the 
police officers and the accused during  the 17 1/2 
hour gap  between his arrest and the recording  of his 
statement. 
The Crown failed to establish a sufficient record of 
the interaction between the accused and police  as to 
eliminate any reasonable doubt about the 
voluntariness of the statement. Thus, the accused's 
statement was excluded. The trial judge then ruled 
that the Crown had not established beyond a 
reasonable doubt the  possession of the cocaine was 
for the purpose of trafficking. However, the accused 
was nonetheless convicted of the lesser but included 
offence of simple possession.
“[A] statement is not admissible if it is made under circumstances that raise a reasonable 
doubt as to its voluntariness. ... It is further well-established that the Crown bears the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the admissibility, or voluntariness, of a statement.”
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Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the trial 
judge erred in excluding  the 
accused's statement. In the 
Crown's view, it was not required 
to produce evidence of everything  said to or done in 
the presence of the accused in order to meet its 
burden of proving voluntariness. 
Voluntariness
Justice Caldwell, delivering  the opinion of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, described the 
common law confessions rule this way:
[A] statement is not admissible if it is made 
under circumstances that raise a reasonable 
doubt as to its voluntariness. Accordingly, a trial 
judge must “s t r ive to unders tand the 
circumstances surrounding  the [statement] and 
ask if it gives rise to a reasonable doubt as to the 
[statement’s] voluntariness.” It is further well-
established that the Crown bears the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the 
admissibility, or voluntariness, of a statement. 
This means it is incumbent on the Crown to 
show affirmatively that an accused was properly 
treated and not questioned outside the context 
of the taking  of the statement in question.  In 
practical terms, the Crown must place before the 
t r ia l judge al l re levant ci rcumstances 
surrounding  the taking  of the statement so that 
the trial judge, having  all of the facts, can form 
his or her own opinion as to whether the 
statement was free and voluntary. [references 
omitted, para. 11]
In this case, although “the Crown is not required to 
call each and every officer who had contact with an 
accused”, there were two particular gaps in the 
evidence. First, the  officer transporting  the accused 
from the place of arrest to the police station was not 
called. Second, there was no evidence as to how the 
accused’s call to legal aid was facilitated nor any 
evidence as to what had been said by persons in 
authority to him during  this interaction. Without 
evidence during  the time police clearly had some 
significant interaction with the accused, the trial 
judge was unable to conclude, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the Crown had met its onus (proving 
that no threat, promise, inducement or coercive 
tactic was used by any person in authority to 
undermine the  voluntariness of the statement). “The 
judge could not be  expected to give the benefit of 
the reasonable doubt arising  from the clear gaps in 
the evidentiary record to the Crown,” said Justice 
Caldwell. The trial judge did not err in holding  the 
Crown had not met its burden of proof or in 
excluding  the statement from evidence. The Crown’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
PHYSICAL	 SEARCH	 MAY	 
ACCOMPANY	 DRUG	 DOG	 HIT
R. v. Frieburg, 2013 MBCA 40                  
 
While surveilling  a  residence, 
police saw the accused park a 
Dodge Charger across the  street 
from it at 11:45 pm. She and two 
men got out and went into the 
residence, leaving  about 35 minutes later in a 
Chevrolet Cavalier registered to her mother. At about 
2:00 am police  obtained a search warrant for the 
residence.   Before the warrant was executed, police 
located and stopped the Cavalier at 3:00 am, one 
mile  from the residence. The accused was arrested 
for possessing  drugs for the purpose of trafficking 
and advised of her rights. Police seized keys to both 
the Cavalier and the Charger from her and she was 
transported to a correctional centre.  A police dog 
attended and did a sniff search around the Cavalier, 
indicating   positive for drugs. Five cell phones, $845 
and a  can of bear spray were found and seized, but 
no drugs were located. A warrant was served on the 
residence at 3:25 am and a  half pound of marijuana, 
two digital scales, three cell phones, score sheets 
and other drug  paraphernalia  were found in the 
house.  At about 4:00 am, a sniff search of the 
Charger parked on the street was conducted.  It had 
air fresheners on the rear-view mirror and Bounce 
dryer sheets in the air vents. This suggested the 
possible  presence of illegal drugs. When the sniffer-
dog  indicated the presence of drugs, the Charger 
was unlocked using  the keys seized from the 
accused and a search turned up  850 ecstasy pills in 
the trunk.
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Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge found the Charger was not 
being  operated by the  accused at the time 
of the arrest and the search occurred long 
after it. The search of the Charger was not 
incidental to arrest, infringed s. 8 of the Charter and 
the evidence of the ecstasy found was excluded as 
evidence under s. 24(2). The accused was acquitted 
of possessing  the  ecstasy for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the accused’s 
acquittal arguing  that the  judge 
erred in finding  that the search of 
the Charger breached s. 8  of the 
Charter rights and in excluding  the evidence. Among 
the Crown’s grounds of appeal, the alleged mistakes 
made by the trial judge included issues concerning 
searches incidental to arrest, privacy expectations 
and whether the search of the Charger was lawful.
Search Incidental to Arrest
The Crown argued that the search of the Charger 
was lawful as an incident to the accused’s arrest at 
3:00 am. But Justice Beard, writing  the Court of 
Appeal’s decision, found the arrest was not lawful, a 
prerequisite to a  valid search incident to an arrest. A 
warrantless arrest under s. 495(1)  of the Criminal 
Code  imparts a  two part test. “The first part of the 
test requires a subjective, personal belief on the part 
of the arresting  officer that there were reasonable 
grounds for the arrest and the second part requires 
objective justification for the subjective belief” said 
Justice Beard. “In other words, a reasonable person 
in the place of the arresting  officer must be able to 
conclude that there were reasonable grounds for the 
arrest.” 
In this case, the officers had obtained a search 
warrant and, while waiting  to execute it, decided to 
look for the accused. When she was located, her car 
was stopped and she was arrested. But officers 
testified that the operative  reasons for the arrest were 
to optimize officer safety by keeping  people away 
from the residence, prevent the destruction of 
evidence and facilitate  the search warrant. These 
were not valid justifications for an arrest. Justice 
Beard stated:
Neither officer stated that the reason for the 
arrest was that he, personally, believed that there 
were reasonable grounds to believe that the 
accused had committed an indictable offence or 
an offence under the CDSA. Both indicated that 
the reason for the arrest at that particular time 
was to keep her away from the residence for 
optimal officer safety during the search of that 
residence. That is not a valid reason for an arrest.  
[the officer] suggested that another reason for the 
arrest was to prevent the destruction of 
evidence.  The preservation of evidence is also 
not a valid reason to arrest, if there is no proof 
that the officer had the required subjective 
grounds at the time of the arrest to make the 
arrest. [para. 23]
Nor would the Court of Appeal infer that the officers 
had the  required subjective belief because police 
had obtained a search warrant, which would require 
a judicial justice be satisfied that there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence had 
been committed.  There was no evidence as to the 
officers’ understanding  of the relationship  between 
obtaining  a  search warrant and making  an arrest. The 
issuing  of a search warrant did not justify  arresting 
the accused and lodging  her at the correctional 
institute. The trial judge’s conclusion that the 
personal belief of the police to arrest the accused 
was based on the authority of the CDSA search 
warrant, rather than using  the warrant as grounds for 
the arrest, was a factual finding  that was not 
disturbed by the Court of Appeal:
In this case, the issue is not whether the officers 
understood the law, but what they subjectively, 
that is, personally, believed. The law is clear that 
the officer must have a subjective belief that 
there are reasonable grounds to make the arrest.  
The officers, although prompted, did not give 
that testimony. This is not a mistake of law, but a 
lack of evidence. The search warrant cannot fill 
that evidentiary gap, in the face of the officers’ 
testimony of their reason for the arrest and the 
trial judge’s finding of fact in that regard .
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For these reasons, I would find that the arrest of 
the accused at 3:00 a.m. was not a lawful arrest 
and, therefore, I would have found that the 
search of the Dodge Charger on the basis that it 
was a search incidental to a lawful arrest at 3:00 
a.m. was an unreasonable search, contrary to s. 
8 of the Charter. [paras. 28-29]
Justice Beard also rejected the  notion that the search 
was incidental to arrest because at the 
time the police conducted the search 
they had reasonable grounds to arrest 
the accused immediately  before 
searching  the Charger. In some cases, a 
search incidental to arrest can precede 
the arrest if the grounds to arrest exist at 
the time of the search. In this case, 
however, the search and the arrest did 
not occur at the same location, as part 
of the same transaction nor did the 
arrest immediately  follow the search. 
The accused was arrested driving  the 
Cavalier an hour before the search of the 
Charger, which was parked about a  mile 
away from the arrest location. So 
although the search of the Charger was 
carried out for a valid purpose 
connected to arrest, it was not within 
the accused’s “immediate surroundings.” 
Justice Beard concluded:
In summary, to be a lawful search incidental to 
arrest, the search must be incidental to the 
arrest.  The search of the vehicle parked on a 
street and located a mile away from the location 
of the arrest, in the circumstances of this case, 
was no t a sea rch o f the “ immedia te 
surroundings” of the arrest location and, as a 
result, was not a search incidental to the arrest.  
Thus, I would have found that the search of the 
Dodge Charger on the basis that it was a search 
incidental to, but preceding, a lawful arrest was 
an unreasonable search that breached s. 8  of the 
Charter. [para. 52]
Sniffer-dog Searches
The police may use a dog  to sniff for drugs without a 
warrant provided they have reasonable grounds to 
suspect the presence of contraband at the place or 
on the person to be searched. In this case, the trial 
judge concluded that the police had the requisite 
suspicion to deploy the sniffer-dog  to search the 
Charger. The issue for the Court of Appeal was 
whether police had the common law authority  to 
proceed with a physical search of the area indicated 
by the dog  without obtaining  a search warrant. Here, 
the area to be searched was a locked and alarmed 
private vehicle (Charger) parked on a public street. 
Justice Beard concluded 
that the common law 
principles for warrantless 
sn i f f e r-dog  sea rches 
includes “police authority 
to physically search the 
area indicated positive for 
drugs (or other items, 
s u ch a s e x p l o s ive s , 
depending  on the dog’s 
training)  by the sniffer 
dogs without a warrant as 
being  an appropriate 
extension of the  common 
law regarding  police 
powers to conduct a 
warrantless search for the 
purpose o f c r imina l 
investigations.” And these 
common-law sniffer dog 
searches are  not limited 
to situations of urgency. She continued:
[T]he common law permits the police to do a 
physical search of the area indicated positive by 
the sniffer-dog  for the item indicated by the 
sniffer-dog, in this case, drugs, without the 
police obtaining a search warrant. This physical 
search is not limited to those situations where 
there is evidence of imminent danger of loss, 
removal, destruction or disappearance of any 
evidence that might be found. Thus, I find that 
the trial judge erred in law when he found that 
the physical search of the trunk was a breach of 
the accused’s s. 8  rights because it was a 
warrantless search and “[t]here was an absence 
of evidence of imminent danger of the loss, 
removal, destruction or disappearance of any 
evidence that might be found in the 
Charger.” [para. 95]
“[T]he common law permits the 
police to do a physical search of 
the area indicated positive by 
the sniffer-dog for the item 
indicated by the sniffer-dog, in 
this case, drugs, without the 
police obtaining a search 
warrant. This physical search is 
not limited to those situations 
where there is evidence of 
imminent danger of loss, 
removal, destruction or 
disappearance of any evidence 
that might be found.” 
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And further:
In this case, the police were lawfully present at 
the Dodge Charger, in that the Dodge Charger 
was parked on a public street and the police 
were not required to trespass on private property 
to access it.  The search of the Dodge Charger 
was not random or arbitrary, in that the police 
were executing  a search warrant at 828  Dennis 
Street, the Dodge Charger was parked in front of, 
and across the road from, 828 Dennis Street, and 
there was evidence to link it to that address.
The police had a reasonable suspicion that there 
were drugs in the Dodge Charger, so they were 
authorized to conduct a common law sniffer-dog 
search.  Upon the dog making the positive 
indication at the trunk, the police were 
authorized to do a physical search of that area 
without obtaining a warrant. 
Finally, upon opening  the trunk, the police 
found a package.   The positive indication by the 
sniffer-dog, together with the information that 
formed the reasonable suspicion leading to the 
deployment of the dog, provided the reasonable 
grounds under s. 489(2) for the police to seize 
the package. [paras. 98-100]
The search of the  Charger’s trunk was reasonable, 
the seizure of the package found therein was lawful 
and no s. 8 Charter infringement occurred. The 
evidence was admissible and the trial judge erred by 
excluding  it under s. 24(2).  The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DETENTION:	 OFFICER’S	 NON-
COMMUNICATED	 INTENTIONS	 
NOT	 RELEVANT
R. v. Koczab, 2013 MBCA 43     
The accused, while driving  his 
vehicle from British Columbia to 
Ontario, was pulled over for 
speeding  in Manitoba.  The police 
officer, after requesting  a driver’s 
licence and registration, noticed the vehicle was 
registered to the accused in British Columbia but his 
driver’s licence was issued in Ontario.  When 
questioned about the different addresses the accused 
replied that he worked in the movie industry  and 
lived at both places. This explanation seemed 
familiar to the officer. A routine police check 
revealed that the accused had been fingerprinted in 
the past for theft and drug  charges, but his record 
showed only one criminal conviction for theft. The 
officer went back to the accused’s vehicle, returned 
his documents, gave him a verbal warning  for 
speeding  and told him that he was free  to go. Only 
10 minutes had elapsed since the beginning  of the 
traffic stop.
The police officer then, believing  he may have 
stopped the accused on a prior occasion, asked him 
if he would mind answering  a few questions.  The 
accused replied, “Yeah go ahead.”  The officer asked 
a series of questions which led him to ask what the 
accused had in his back seat. He replied that he had 
a couple of suitcases but denied that there was any 
liquor, drugs or large amounts of cash in the 
vehicle. When asked “So what’s in the suitcases?”  
the accused said, “Clothes, do you want to see?”  
The officer said “Sure.” After a brief exchange, the 
accused, without prompting, opened the back door 
and the suitcases.  The officer did not search the 
suitcases, but noticed that the carpet had been 
altered near the  back seats. This caused the officer to 
think  that there might be a hidden compartment. The 
officer had considerable experience in detecting  and 
locating  such compartments. He had personally 
investigated and discovered hidden compartments in 
approximately  50 other cases. He told the accused 
“I just have to go to my car for a minute,” did so and 
called for back-up. The officer intended to arrest the 
BY THE BOOK:
Power	 of	 Seizure: Criminal Code
s.  489(2)  Every peace officer … who is lawfully 
present  in a place pursuant to a warrant or 
otherwise in the execution of duties may, 
without a warrant, seize any thing  that the 
officer believes on reasonable grounds ... (c)  will afford 
evidence in respect of an offence against this or any other 
Act of Parliament.
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accused but, before doing  so, decided he would give 
the accused an opportunity to provide an innocent 
explanation for the altered carpet. He went back to 
the accused and asked him the  following  three 
questions:
1. Have you had any bodywork done to the 
vehicle? Answer: No
2. Have you had any panels removed? Answer: 
No
3.  Do the back seats fold down? Answer: Yeah, I’ll 
show you.
 
Without being  asked, the accused proceeded to fold 
the back seats forward and the  officer noticed more 
damage to the carpet and smelled the strong  odour 
of fresh silicone, a product the officer knew was not 
used in factory vehicle  installations. Believing  the 
fresh smell of silicone indicated the recent use to 
create a sealed hidden compartment that may 
contain drugs, the officer arrested the accused for 
drug  possession and advised him of his right to 
counsel.  A vehicle search incidental to arrest 
revealed 17 one-kilogram bricks of cocaine in a 
silicone-sealed hidden compartment underneath the 
backseat.  The officer returned to the accused, 
arrested him for cocaine trafficking  and re-advised 
him of his rights. He was again given his right to 
counsel but declined to contact anyone.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The trial judge concluded that the officer 
detained the accused before  he asked the 
three  questions. In his view, the accused 
was detained when the officer formulated 
his intention to arrest, said he would be back in a 
minute, returned to his car, called for back-up  and 
came back to the SUV to ask the  first question. The 
detention did not breach s. 9 of the Charter because 
the judge concluded the officer had reasonable 
grounds to suspect the accused was a  drug  courier 
before he called for back-up.  However, since the 
accused was detained before the  officer asked him 
the last three questions, his rights under s. 10 were 
breached. He had not been advised of the reason for 
his detention (s. 10(a))  nor was he told of his right to 
counsel before answering  the questions (s. 10(b)).  
The cocaine was excluded as evidence under s. 24
(2)  and the accused was acquitted of trafficking  and 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the acquittal 
arguing, in part, that the trial judge 
erred in finding  that the accused 
had been psychologically detained 
by the police and therefore was entitled to be 
advised of his s. 10(b)  rights before being  asked the 
last three questions. 
A person is detained such that Charter rights are 
triggered if they can demonstrate that they had been 
subject to significant psychologically  restraint in the 
circumstances. The test to determine whether the 
there  has been “significant” psychological restraint is 
whether the police conduct would cause a 
reasonable person in the  accused’s circumstances to 
conclude that they were  not free to go and had to 
comply with the police direction or demand. This 
approach to determining  detention has been 
described as “claimant” or “detainee-centered 
objective analysis.” Since the test is detainee-
centered, the significance of the officer’s non-
communicated mindset if largely  removed. Factors 
to consider include the circumstances giving  rise to 
the encounter, the nature of the police conduct and 
the particular characteristics or circumstances of the 
individual. 
Here, the Crown submitted that the trial judge erred 
in considering  the officer’s non-communicated 
thoughts and intentions to arrest the accused in the 
detainee-centered objective analysis. The accused, 
on the  contrary, suggested that the trial judge 
correctly applied the proper legal test. Justice 
Chartier, authoring  the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s 
majority opinion, concluded that the trial judge’s 
finding  of detention was based on the following 
facts:
1. the officer’s non-communicated belief that he 
was going to arrest the accused;
2. the officer’s implied direction or order to the 
accused that he was not to leave;
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3. the officer’s return to his car;
4. the officer’s non-communicated call for back-
up; and
5. the officer’s non-communicated intention to 
come back and to ask the accused more 
questions to see if there was an innocent 
explanation.
The problem with this, the majority noted, was that 
facts 1, 4 and 5 (the officer’s intentions or thoughts) 
would not have been known to the accused because 
they had not been communicated to him and 
therefore were irrelevant in a detainee-centered 
objective analysis. Fact 3  was neutral while fact 2 - 
the implied direction - had to be accepted on 
appeal . Thus, the t r ia l judge improper ly 
overemphasized the officer’s non-communicated 
intent in concluding  there had been a detention. 
Justice Chartier put the detainee-centered objective 
approach this way:
[T]the test to determine whether the accused has 
demonstrated the required “significant” 
psychological restraint is whether the police 
conduct would cause a reasonable person in the 
accused’s circumstances to conclude that the 
accused was not free to go and had to answer 
the questions posed by the officer when he 
returned from his car.  In essence, a trial judge is 
to evaluate the overall situation as it would be 
perceived by a reasonable person standing in the 
shoes of the accused, having regard to the 
following:  to what that person would have said, 
heard, seen, thought or done; to the officer’s 
words or actions which would have been heard 
or seen by the accused; to any relevant facts 
surrounding  the encounter; and to the accused’s 
personal circumstances. [para. 44]
So then, with the remaining  facts, would a 
reasonable person, standing  in the shoes of the 
accused, believe he  was detained. The majority 
didn’t think so. Although not fatal to a  determination 
of detention, the accused chose not to testify 
therefore there was no evidence as to how he 
regarded, understood or interpreted the interaction 
with police. Using  the testimony of the officer the 
majority concluded:
• Circumstances of the Encounter. The accused 
was handed back his documents, told he was free 
to go, asked whether he would agree to answer a 
few questions and did consent to answer them. 
The officer’s words, “I just have to go to my car for 
a minute” - characterized by the trial judge as an 
implied direction - were clearly not an order not 
to leave.  There was no evidence that the officer 
made a gesture, such as lifting  his index finger to 
indicate that the accused should wait, or that the 
the officer’s words were expressed in an 
authoritative tone of voice.  More than just the 
words the officer chose was needed.  And 
throughout the encounter, the accused was 
relaxed, composed and cooperative, opening  the 
back door as well as the suitcases, and inviting 
the officer to look into his suitcases and behind 
the rear seat, all on his own initiative. At no time 
during  the encounter did the accused’s level of 
cooperation, conversation or interaction with the 
police change.  
• Nature of the Police Conduct. There was no 
physical contact between the officer and the 
accused and there  interaction was polite and 
cordial. No voices were raised and there was no 
evidence that any  form of intimidation or 
coercion was used.  The duration of the encounter 
was relatively short: 14 minutes had elapsed from 
the time the accused was told he was free to go 
until the time of arrest.  The officer always 
confirmed that the accused was letting  him ask 
further questions and was letting  him look into the 
trunk of the car. It was made clear to the accused, 
at least inferentially, that he had a choice in the 
interaction and his consent and cooperation were 
given each step of the way.
• Circumstances of the Accused. He was 29 years 
old and seemed confident and relaxed. There was 
no evidence that he  was in any way intimidated 
by the conduct of the police or by the situation 
nor any suggestion that he was under any form of 
duress or compulsion to comply.  Instead, he was 
the one encouraging  the officer to look inside his 
vehicle and at his personal belongings. There was 
nothing  to show that the accused’s compliance 
and cooperation with the officer was anything  but 
voluntary.
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Had the trial judge considered the facts using  the 
correct detainee-centered objective approach and 
not improperly focussed on the officer’s non-
communicated intent there would not have been a 
finding  of a psychological detention. Thus, the trial 
judge’s conclusion of a detention was unreasonable 
and not supported by the evidence. There was no s. 
10 Charter breach and, even if there was, the 
majority would have ruled the evidence admissible 
under s. 24(2). Since an acquittal would not 
necessarily have followed had the trial judge 
properly applied the law, the Crown’s appeal was 
allowed and a new trial was ordered.  
A Second Opinion
Justice Monnin, in dissent, concluded that the trial 
judge did not err in finding  that the accused had 
been psychologically detained and that his s. 10 
rights had been breached: 
In my view, a reasonable person, having  been 
questioned aggressively on issues relating to 
drug convictions and whether he was currently 
involved in drug  trafficking, having  previously 
been told he was free to go, but then indirectly 
told to stay where he was, would likely conclude 
that he was not free to go and had to comply 
with that directive. It would take a brave soul in 
the circumstances to defy the state actor and go 
merrily on his way. He would, no doubt, soon 
be involved in a police chase. [para. 93]
He also would not have interfered with the trial 
judge’s ruling  on the exclusion of evidence under s. 
24(2). 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Canadian Forces Military Police National Motorcycle Relay Ride
Once again, Military  Police, volunteers,  and civilian supporters of our troops are 
gearing up for the 5th Annual Military Police National Motorcycle Relay Ride, 
which is due to hit the open road in St. John’s, NL on August 2. 
On April 23, Major Bob Edwards,  the 2012 Ontario Ride Captain, accompanied by 
other riders, presented a $75,000 cheque to the Children’s Wish Foundation and 
the Military  Police Fund for Blind Children. These funds were raised during the 2012 
coast-to-coast ride, which set a new record for the ride’s fundraising initiatives. 
“We are extremely proud of the significant  contribution made by the MPNMRR to the Military  Police Fund for Blind 
Children,” said L/Col. Gilles Sansterre, Chair of the fund, “The lives of many visually  impaired children across this 
country are enriched by this generous donation.”
The MPNMRR is the longest  annual motorcycle relay in the world with our National Riders covering in excess of 
10,000 kilometers during the event. On August 2, the 5th Annual MPNMRR kicks off on “The Rock” where motorcycle 
enthusiasts will roll their throttles out  of St. John’s,  NL and will visit  all of the major military  establishments across 
Canada, arriving in beautiful Victoria, BC on August 25. Courageous riders will also venture south from the frigid 
conditions of the Northwest Territories for the second year in a row, riding a whopping 3,459 kilometers. 
Since riders  rolled out of St John’s, NL for the first ride in 2009,  over $170,000 has been raised for numerous charities. 
This year funds raised will support the Military  Police Fund for Blind Children nationwide and the Children’s Wish 
Foundation in select provinces. 
Lamont French, the MPNMRR National Chairperson, has been involved in the ride since 
its initial launch in 2009 and is very  passionate about  fundraising for kids stating, “The 
privilege of paying it forward to children is an honour.” 
 
Join the 5th Annual Military  Police National Motorcycle Relay  Ride, as  it  rolls through 
your area between August 2 and 25. All motorcycle enthusiasts are welcome to 
participate, whether it  is as a national, provincial or local rider.  For more information on 
the ride, how  to register, become a sponsor, donate, or participate in our online 
auctions, visit  the MPNMRR website at: www.mpnmrr.ca. For more information on the 
charities the MPNMRR represents, visit www.mpfbc.com and www.childrenswish.ca. 
!"#!$%!&'(!)*+,-%).)*!!
/01)-20!3!*)!(,-4!
56#7#897:!
!"#!57;<"=>?9";!=@!?8!'<"A#!2"==9#6:!
56=!BC8DE!56#FC<"8DE!56#A#8"8DE!-#7>=8FC8DG!
!"#$%&'"#(')(&**(+$%!,-.(/012$2)1-(&3#(4"-5)3#"1-!
!-)2!-0%!)/!!,!&'(!)*+,-%).)*!!5)-2,**)&!,*&3!
4#;8=9#!7>#?H#67: 
+6?8H!/#'8D#BC7E!56C8<C>?B!%=BIJKC8#!LCD"!2<"==B!
67"('1&8"#9(&'(:)*0,;$3"(1"#"!3"#('7"(3&!)3<(=1<(!">38"*$-('"**-(7$-(-')19(?1),('7"("2"3'-(')('7"(&""1,&'7<(
67$-(51"-"3'&!)3(7&-(1&1"*9(;""3(8$2"3(&3#($3($'(7"(1"2"&*-('7"(*"&#"1-7$5(*"--)3-(7"(*"&13"#($3('7"(?)%0-()?(&3(
$3'"13&!)3&*(!1"(-')1,<(67$-(;*03'.(-'1&$87'#?)1@&1#(&%%)03'(51)2$#"-($32&*0&;*"($3-$87'-($3')(,&3&8$38('7"(
&""1#%1$-$-(@$'7(-'0#"3'-.(-'&$.(%),,03$'9(&3#(3"2"1("3#$38(,"#$&(&%"3!)3<(67"('&A"&@&9-(?1),('7$-(
51"-"3'&!)3(-7)0*#(;"(1"B0$1"#(1"&#$38(?)1("2"19(51$3%$5&*($3('7"(3&!)3<(
M="8#.C<"?#B!4#;#7E!)N#<I"A#!/C6#<9=6E!!"#!O0!&=A#!P!QI;7R!+=I8F?"=8!
=1<(C"9"-(-7&1"-(#"'&$*-()?('7"(C"9"-(?&,$*9(1"-5)3-"(')('7"('1&8$%(A$**$38()?(7$-(#&087'"1.(D,$*9(&'(E*&%"(:&3#
9)3(F$87(/%7))*(GHIIJK<(!"*$;"1&'"(#"%$-$)3-(&;)0'(7&3#*$38(3&!)3&*(&3#(*)%&*(,"#$&.(!3&3%"-.(#)3&!)3-.(
%),,03$'9(7"&*$38.(-055)1'(5")5*"(&3#()18&3$L&!)3-.('7"(%1"&!)3()?(67"(MN(O)2"(P(Q09-M(R)03#&!)3(&3#(
,)1"<((=1<(C"9"-()0'*$3"-(3)'(S0-'('7"($,,"#$&'"(&""1,&'7(&3#(1"-5)3-".(;0'("2"3'-('7&'()%%011"#($3('7"(9"&1-(
'7&'(?)**)@"#<((67"(3&11&!2"('"**-(7)@(67"(/'&3#&1#(4"-5)3-"(E1)')%)*(@&-(#"2"*)5"#.(#"-%1$;"-(7)@($'(@)1A-.(
&3#(@79($'($-(?&-'(;"%),$38(&(-'&3#&1#($3(,&39(-%7))*-(&3#(#$-'1$%'-<(
2D9S!'SMS!/#'8F6#?E!'6A?F?!T%,U!5=BC<#!/#>?69J#89!M#$<=!-#DC=8?B!2('!!T-#"6#FU!
/8'<(!">3#1"&(@&-(D3'19(6"&,(O"&#"1(&'(:)*0,;$3"(F$87(/%7))*(GTUUUK(&3#(6"&,(O"&#"1(#01$38('7"(V0**#)L"1(
N3%$#"3'($3(Q1&3;9.(:W(GHIIXK<(F"(7"*5"#(#"2$-"(&3#("Y"%0'"('7"('&%!%&*(5*&3(?)1('7"(F)-'&8"(4"-%0"(&'(E*&%"(
:&39)3(F$87(/%7))*(GHIIJK<(>8&$3($3(HIIJ(7"(@&-('7"(6"&,(O"&#"1(#01$38(&3(W&%"1(4"-%0"(@7"1"()2"1('7$1'9(
1)03#-(@"1"(!1"#<(/8'<(!">3#1"&(@&-('7"(E&'1)*(/05"12$-)1(&3#(D3'19(6"&,(O"&#"1(#01$38('7"(Z)0'7([$'7(&(
=$--$)3(-7))!38-(GHII\K<(67$-(@&-(&3(&%!2"(-7))!38(&'(&(9)0'7(,$--$)3('1&$3$38(%"3'"1(@7"1"(?)01(9)038(
&#0*'-(@"1"(-7)'.('@)()?(@7),(#$"#< !
MS!4#AC8!%?J#6=8E!.S2<SE!-S2S(S!
]<(C"2$3(:&,"1)3($-(&(!$5*),&'(@$'7('7"(>,"1$%&3(>%&#",9()?(DY5"1'-($3(61&0,&!%(/'1"--(&3#(&(V)&1#(:"1!!"#(
DY5"1'($3(61&0,&!%(/'1"--<(N3(%)3%"1'(@$'7('7"(4)9&*(:&3&#$&3(=)03'"#(E)*$%".(V"7&2$)1&*(/%$"3%"-(P3$'.(7"(
#"2"*)5"#(:&3&#&^-(!1-'(%),51"7"3-$2".(,0*!#$-%$5*$3&19('71"&'(&--"--,"3'('1&$3$38(51)81&,(&3#(%011"3'*9(
-"12"-()3('7"(:&3&#$&3(671"&'(>--"--,"3'(61&$3$38(V)&1#<(F"(&*-)('1&$3-(%1$-$-(1"-5)3-"('"&,-(3&!)3&**9(&3#(
$3'"13&!)3&**9(&3#(%)3-0*'-(@$'7(-%7))*-(&3#(%),,03$!"-($,5&%'"#(;9('1&0,&< !
!
(#F8#7F?;E!*=A#JK#6!VE!WXYZ![:XX?J!9=!\:XX>J!
T-#DC796?"=8!]:ZX?J!#![:XX?JU!
MI7"<#!087"9I9#!,@!$6C"7"!%=BIJKC?!
]Y\!.<$6CF#!$=IB#A?6FE!*#^!(#79JC879#6E!$%!
!
56##6#DC796?"=8!C7!6#_IC6#F!
`Y[XSXX!TK;!2#>9S!ZXE!WXYZU!!!`WZXSXX!T?%#6!,<9S!YE!WXYZU!
+=6!?FFC"=8?B!C8@=6J?"=8E!AC7C9!=I6!^#K7C9#!?9!^^^SK<B#F8S8#9!
!"#!$%!&?^!)8@=6<#J#89!/CA#67C9;!*#9^=6H!C7!?!7IK#<=JJC&##!=@!9"#!$6C"7"!%=BIJKC?!!
'77=<C?"=8!=@!%"C#@7!=@!5=BC<#!^C9"!6#>6#7#89?"=8!@6=J!9"#!@=BB=^C8D!>?6"<C>?"8D!?D#8<C#7!
Foundational Courses:
Intelligence Theories and  Applications
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Intelligence Communications
Specialized Courses:
Competitive Intelligence
Analyzing Financial Crimes
Tactical Criminal Intelligence 
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence
Entrance Requirements:
Proof of completion of bachelor degree;  OR
A minimum of two years of post secondary 
education plus a minimum of five years
of progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information.  Applicants must also write a 
500 – 1000 word essay on a related topic of 
their choice OR
Applicants who have not completed a 
minimum of 2 years post-secondary 
education must have eight to ten years of 
progressive and specialized experience in 
working with the analysis of data and 
information (Dean/Director discretion).  
Applicants are required to write a 500-1000 
word essay on a related topic of their 
choice.
For detailed requirements please visit the 
JIBC Website.
ONLINE GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAMS
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS | TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Justice Institute of British Columbia, Canada | www.jibc.ca |graduatestudies@jibc.ca
Foundational Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Theories and Applications
A survey course that introduces the student 
to the discipline of intelligence and provides 
the student with an understanding of how 
intelligence systems function, how they fit 
within the policymaking systems of free 
societies, and how they are managed and 
controlled. The course will integrate 
intelligence theory with the methodology 
and processes that evolved over time to 
assist the intelligence professional. The 
course will develop in the student a range 
of advanced research and thinking skills 
fundamental to the intelligence analysis 
process.
Intelligence Communications
The skill most appreciated by 
the intelligence consumer is the 
ability to communicate, briefly 
and effectively, the results of 
detailed analytic work. This 
course, through repetitive 
application of a focused set of 
skills to a body of information of 
constantly increasing 
complexity, is designed to 
prepare intelligence analysts to 
deliver a variety of intelligence 
products in both written and oral 
formats.
Advanced Analytical Techniques
Topics include: drug/terrorism/other 
intelligence issues, advanced 
analytic techniques (including 
strategic analysis, predicative 
intelligence etc.), collection 
management, intelligence sources, 
management theory (large 
organizations), attacking criminal 
organizations, crisis management, 
negotiation techniques, strategic 
planning, local/regional updates 
and briefing techniques.
Specialized Courses
(students enrolled in either graduate certificate are required to complete the 
foundational courses)
Intelligence Analysis Tactical Criminal Analysis
Competitive Intelligence 
This course explores the business processes involved in 
providing foreknowledge of the competitive environment; the 
prelude to action and decision. The course focuses on 
supporting decisions with predictive insights derived from 
intelligence gathering practices and methodologies used in the 
private sector. Lectures, discussions, and projects focus on the 
desires and expectations of business decision-makers to gain 
first-mover advantage and act more quickly than the 
competition.
Analyzing Financial Crimes
This course examines the nature and scope of financial crimes 
and many of the tools used by law enforcement in the 
preparation of a financial case. Included in this course is a 
detailed treatment of the following: laws which serve to aid in 
the detection and prosecution of these crimes, the types of 
business records available, types of bank records available, an 
examination of offshore business and banking operations, and 
the collection and analysis of this information, with emphasis 
placed on Net Worth and Expenditure Analysis. In addition, 
special treatment is given to the detection and prosecution of 
money laundering, various types of money laundering 
schemes, and the relationship of money laundering to 
terrorism.
Tactical Criminal Intelligence
This course is an introduction to law enforcement 
terminology, practices, concepts, analysis, and 
intelligence. The course will introduce the student to 
the discipline of crime analysis and law enforcement 
intelligence through the study of the intelligence 
cycle and the intelligence determinants. The role and 
responsibilities of an analyst within each sub-topic 
will be addressed. Additionally, the utilization of 
analytical software will be introduced.
Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence 
The course reviews the key requirements for 
intelligence in law enforcement and homeland 
security. The course focuses the use of advanced 
analytic methodologies to analyze structured and 
unstructured law enforcement data produced by all 
source collection. Students will apply these 
concepts, using a variety of tools, to develop 
descriptive, explanatory, and estimative products 
and briefings for decision-makers in the field.
